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INTRODUCTION 
For much of this century, American foreign affairs law has as­
sumed that there is a sharp distinction between what is foreign and 
what is domestic, between what is external and what is internal. 
This assumption underlies a dual regime of constitutional law, in 
which federal regulation of foreign affairs is subject to a different, 
and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than fed­
eral regulation of domestic affairs. In what is perhaps its most fa­
mous endorsement of this proposition, the Supreme Court stated in 
1936 that "the federal power over external affairs [is] in origin and 
essential character different from that over internal affairs."1 For a 
variety of reasons, however, the distinction between domestic and 
foreign affairs has been eroding in recent years, and this trend is 
likely to continue.2 As a result, there will be an increasing need to 
reexamine the differential treatment of federal foreign affairs 
powers. 
This Article reexamines one example of such differential treat­
ment - the purported immunity of the treaty power from federal­
ism limitations. The Constitution provides that the President "shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present con­
cur."3 Since the adoption of the Constitution, the President has ex­
ercised this power to commit the United States to hundreds of 
international obligations. The President also has committed the 
United States to thousands of additional obligations without going 
through the Article II process, by means of so-called "executive 
agreements."4 The treaties entered into by the President are 
deemed by the Constitution to be part of the supreme law of the 
land, 5 and the Supreme Court has construed this supremacy to ex-
1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
2. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, PoLmCAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL .ANSWERS: DoES THE 
RuLE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 8-9 (1992); Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future 
in the Global Village, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1441, 1442 (1994); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, 
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1617, 1670-77, 1714-15 (1997). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
4. See Lours HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 215 
(2d ed. 1996) (noting that "[s]ince our national beginnings Presidents have made some 1600 
treaties with the consent of the Senate" and that Presidents "have made many thousands of 
other international agreements without seeking Senate consent"). For a recent list of the 
many treaties and executive agreements to which the United States is currently a party, see 
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AovrsoR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 8732, TREATIES IN FoRCE: 
A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
FORCE ON JAN. 1, 1997 (1997). 
5. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .  "). The Supreme 
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tend to executive agreements as well. 6 This means, among other 
things, that treaties and executive agreements preempt inconsistent 
state law.7 Because of the supremacy of treaty law over state law, 
the treaty power implicates important issues concerning this coun­
try's federal system of government. 
A central principle underlying American federalism, often re­
cited by the Supreme Court, is that the national government is one 
of limited, enumerated powers. 8 A corollary of this principle is that 
when the federal government makes supreme federal law, it is re­
strained in what it can do either by inherent limits in the scope of its 
delegated powers, or by the Tenth Amendment's reservation of 
powers to the states, or both.9 To be sure, these restraints are not 
nearly as strong as they once were, and the Supreme Court's will­
ingness to police these restraints has varied throughout U.S. his­
tory.10 Nevertheless, neither the Court nor most commentators 
deny the existence of such restraints. Even in the Garcia decision, 
the low point of judicial protection of federalism, the Court ac­
knowledged that there are "limitation[ s] on federal authority inher­
ent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers" and that 
Court has held that this supremacy applies only to treaties that are "self-executing." See, e.g., 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 
(1829). See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 
89 AM. J. INTI.. L. 695 (1995) (discussing the self-execution requirement). The automatic 
supremacy of some treaties in the U.S. system distinguishes this country from many other 
countries, such as Great Britain, where treaties become domestic law only after they are 
implemented by the legislature. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC lNTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW 47-48 (4th ed. 1990) (describing the practice in Great Britain). 
6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
7. For an early confirmation of the supremacy of treaties over state law, see Ware v. 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (Chase, J.). The other principal form of interna· 
tional law - customary international law - is not mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, and 
its domestic-law status is less certain. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. 
L. REv. 815 (1997) (questioning the proposition that customary international law has the 
status of federal common law). 
8. For recent statements by the Court to this effect, see, for example, City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); and 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). For earlier statements, see cases cited infra 
note 162. 
9. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 {1992). When I refer to the Tenth 
Amendment, I am referring, like the modern Supreme Court, to "any implied constitutional 
limitation on [the federal government's] authority to regulate state activities, whether 
grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally 
from the Constitution." South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 {1988); see also Printz 
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2379 n.13 (1997) ("Our system of dual sovereignty is re­
flected in numerous constitutional provisions . . .  and not only those, like the Tenth Amend­
ment, that speak to the point explicitly.") (citation omitted). 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 41-52, 263-65. 
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"[t]he States unquestionably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of 
sovereign authority.' "11 
This is not the conventional wisdom, however, with respect to 
the treaty power. Although the treaty power is understood as being 
subject to the individual rights protections of the Constitution,12 
and perhaps also to separation of powers restrictions,13 treaties and 
executive agreements are not thought to be limited either by subject 
matter or by the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the 
states. As Professor Lori Damrosch has stated, "our constitutional 
law is clear: the treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on 
the states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights should not 
be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty ob­
ligations."14 For the sake of convenience, I will refer to this conven­
tional wisdom as the "nationalist view." The nationalist view has 
been endorsed by a number of prominent foreign affairs commenta­
tors,15 as well as by the influential Restatement (Third) of the For­
eign Relations Law of the United States.16 
As suggested by Professor Damrosch, the nationalist view of the 
treaty power has two components. First, largely on _the basis of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland,17 it generally is 
understood today that "the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the 
several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does 
11. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985) (quoting 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also Garcia, 469 
U.S. at 547 ("What has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution's fed­
eral structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and con­
tent of those limitations."). 
12. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). 
13. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 195. Some commentators contend, for example, 
that an international agreement cannot be self-executing if it "would achieve what lies within 
the exclusive law-making power of Congress under the Constitution." See REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 111 cmt. i (1987) [here­
inafter REsTATEMENT (THIRD)]; but cf. REsT.li.TEMENT (THIRD), supra reporters' note 6 (not­
ing that "[t]here is no definitive authority" for such a rule). Some commentators also suggest 
that the treaty power is subject to the prohibitions in Article I, Section 9, such as the prohibi­
tion on granting titles of nobility. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra § 302 cmt. b. 
14. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self­
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530 (1991). 
15. In addition to Professor Damrosch, see, for example, HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191, 
197; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 34, 
46-47 (1997). 
16. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmts. c-d; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 13, § 302 reporters' notes 2-3; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. b. 
17. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In Holland, the Court upheld a migratory bird protection statute 
as a valid implementation of a treaty with Great Britain, notwithstanding the argument 
(plausible at the time) that the statute exceeded Congress's domestic lawmaking powers. For 
a discussion of Holland, see infra text accompanying notes 185-94. 
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not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements. "18 Sec­
ond, while it "was once widely accepted" that treaties could be 
made only with respect to matters of "international concern,"19 
most commentators today either disagree with such a limitation or 
assume that it is insignificant, given that most matters upon which 
treaties are likely to be concluded can plausibly be characterized as 
of international concern.20 
In this Article, I question the nationalist view. As I explain, the 
two components of the nationalist view have developed in isolation. 
While either component might seem relatively unproblematic by it­
self, when considered together they violate the principle of limited, 
enumerated powers. The treaty power in our Constitution is a 
power to make supreme federal law. If such law can be made on 
any subject, without regard to the rights of the states, then the 
treaty power gives the federal government essentially plenary 
power vis-a-vis the states. Such plenary power, however, is exactly 
what American federalism denies. This inconsistency between the 
nationalist view and American federalism is particularly significant 
today, in light of the Supreme Court's renewed commitment to pro­
tecting federalism and the rapidly expanding nature of this coun­
try's treaty commitments.21 
I should make clear at the outset the nature of my argument. I 
am not defending here the value of federalism, or judicial review of 
federalism, subjects that have generated enormous literature.22 My 
argument is simply that if federalism is to be the subject of judicial 
protection - as the current Supreme Court appears to believe -
there is no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity 
from such protection. My argument is one against treaty power ex­
ceptionalism, not necessarily one in favor of federalism. In addi­
tion, I am not assuming here the legitimacy of any particular 
method of constitutional interpretation, such as originalism or tex­
tualism. Instead, I consider all the standard interpretive materials, 
including text, history, structure, and changed circumstances, and I 
18. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. d. 
19. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 197. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 247-55. 
21. See infra Part I. 
22. For a recent survey of arguments for and against federalism, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating 
the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1484 (1987) (book review). For a useful discussion 
of various models of federalism protection, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Feder­
alism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1563 (1994). 
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conclude that none of these materials justifies giving the treaty 
power special immunity from federalism limitations. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes why the re­
lationship between the treaty power and American federalism is 
particularly significant today, in light of recent changes in the na­
ture of treaty-making, as well as the recent federalism jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court. Part II examines materials from the Found­
ing period and the nineteenth century and concludes that, contrary 
to claims by its proponents, the nationalist view lacks substantial 
support in history. Part ID recounts how the nationalist view be­
came orthodoxy, beginning with the Supreme Court's 1920 decision 
in Holland and followed by the eventual academic repudiation of a 
subject matter limitation on the treaty power. Part IV then sets 
forth a critique of the nationalist view. In particular, it questions 
the three principal justifications for the nationalist_view: that the 
treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions because that 
power has been exclusively delegated to the federal government; 
that federalism limitations are unnecessary because the political 
process is sufficient to protect states' rights; and that imposing fed­
eralism limitations on the treaty power would unduly interfere with 
the ability of the federal government to speak with one voice in 
foreign affairs. Part V argues that, while it may not be feasible to 
limit the treaty power by subject matter, this power should at least 
be subject to the same federalism limitations as Congress's legisla­
tive powers. To the extent that this conclusion would require over­
ruling Holland, this Part argues that the justifications for stare 
decisis are weak in this context, given the substantial changes in 
both the nature of treaty-making and the scope of permissible fed­
eral legislation. 
I .  CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FEDERALISM lssUE 
The relationship between the treaty power and American feder­
alism is not a new issue. It has been a matter of controversy since 
the Founding of the Constitution. It also was the subject of sub­
stantial academic and official attention during both the early part of 
this century and the 1950s.23 During the last several decades, how­
ever, it seems largely to have receded from view. I n  this Part, I 
explain why this issue is likely to come back into focus, and why it 
deserves our attention. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 177-81, 210-13. 
396 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:390 
A. Changes in Treaty-Making 
To those unfamiliar with international law, it might seem that 
the treaty power would be an unlikely threat to federalism. Trea­
ties, after all, conce!Jl the relations among nations, whereas federal­
ism concerns the relationship between the national government and 
the constituent states. To put it differently, treaties concern inter­
national relations whereas federalism concerns intra-national 
relations. 
This dichotomy might have been accurate at one time in Ameri­
can history, when treaties were generally bilateral and regulated 
matters such as diplomatic immunity, military neutrality, and re­
moval of trade barriers.24 The nature of treaty-making, however, 
has undergone a radical transformation, especially in the years since 
World War II. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
explains, "[u]ntil recently, international law was essentially custom­
ary law: agreements made particular arrangements between partic­
ular parties, but were not ordinarily used for general law-making 
for states."25 During the latter part of this century, however, there 
has been a proliferation of treaties, such that treaty-making has 
now eclipsed custom as the primary mode of international law­
making.26 Moreover, many of these treaties take the form of de­
tailed multilateral instruments negotiated and drafted at interna­
tional conferences. These treaties resemble and are designed to 
operate as international "legislation" binding on much of the 
world.27 
Even more significant than these structural changes is the 
change in the content of modern treaty-making. While many trea­
ties continue to concern matters traditionally viewed as inter-na­
tional in nature, numerous others concern matters that in the past 
countries would have addressed wholly domestically. This change 
in treaty-making is most evident in the area of international human 
rights law, which purports to regulate the relationship between na­
tions and their own citizens. There is now general agreement "that 
how a state treats individual human beings, including its own citi­
zens, in respect of their human rights, is not the state's own business 
24. See generally RALsroN HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES 1789-1817 (1920); 
ARTiiUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, chs. v, VI (1947). 
25. REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. I, introductory note, at 18. 
26. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. I, introductory note, at 18; see also 
REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. III, introductory note, at 144. 
27. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. III, introductory note, at 144; HENKIN, 
supra note 4, at 176; Loms HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PoLmcs AND VALUES 42 (1995). 
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alone . . . but is a matter of international concern and a proper 
subject for regulation by international law."28 As a result, there are 
today a host of multilateral human rights treaties that purport to 
confer a variety of rights that individuals can assert against their 
own governments. These treaties address issues such as racial and 
gender equality, criminal procedure and punishment, and religious 
freedom.29 
Tb.is transformation in treaty-making is so fundamental that it 
alters the very essence of international commitments. As Professor 
Henkin has explained, "[h]uman rights law has shaken the sources 
of international law, reshaped its character, enlarged its domain."30 
Because treaties now regulate matters that countries traditionally 
have considered internal, there is an increasing likelihood of over­
lap, and conflict, with domestic law. Tb.is is particularly so, given 
that "in certain important respects, international human rights 
norms are more rights-protective than the corresponding domestic 
law standards."31 In a federalist system like the United States, this 
means that some of the overlap and conflict is likely to occur at the 
state level. 
28. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. VII, introductory note, at 144-45. 
29. The most prominent human rights treaties include the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 l.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter CRq; the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 
4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; the Convention on the Elimi­
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-38 (1994), 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13, [hereinafter CEDAW]; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEc. 
Doc. D, 95-2, (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, 
(1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. For a discussion of these 
and other human rights treaties, see generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST liANNuM, IN­
TERNATIONAL HUMAN Rimrrs: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1995). 
30. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 31, 
36 (1995-96); see also John P. Humphrey, The Revolution in the Law of Human Rights, 4 
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1975) (describing this change as the most "radical development in the 
whole history of international law"). For discussions of how this new international law devel­
oped, see Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF Rimrrs: THE COVE­
NANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-31 (1981); and Louis B. Sohn, The New 
International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. 
REv. 1 (1982). 
31. Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A Fit­
ting Celebration of the Bicentennial of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 24 U. ToL. L. REv. 203, 204 
(1992); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 567, 567 (1997) ("The human rights movement is now turning its attention to conditions 
in the United States, and it is increasingly finding instances in which such practices fall short 
of international standards."). 
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Another important development during this period has been the 
increasing use by the President of executive agreements. Executive 
agreements are, quite simply, international agreements concluded 
by the President without the two-thirds senatorial advice and con­
sent specified in Article II of the Constitution.32 Executive agree­
ments approved in advance or after the fact by a majority of both 
houses of Congress are referred to as "congressional-executive 
agreements."33 Executive agreements concluded by the President 
alone are referred to as "sole executive agreements."34 The 
Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutional legitimacy of execu­
tive agreements,35 and it has held that even sole executive agree­
ments are supreme federal law and thus supersede inconsistent 
state law.36 The Court has not addressed the permissible scope of 
executive agreements, but the prevailing view today is that at least 
congressional-executive agreements are fully interchangeable with 
treaties and thus may be used any time that a treaty would be 
proper.37 
While executive agreements were relatively infrequent during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the vast majority of 
international agreements concluded by the President in the latter 
half of this century have been in the form of executive agreements 
rather than Article II treaties.38 Commentators have debated at 
various times the constitutional legitimacy of such agreements,39 
32. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. a. 
33. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. e. 
34. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. g. 
35. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-88 {1981) (upholding sole exec· 
utive agreement suspending state-law-based claims against Iran); United States v. Curtiss­
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 {1936) (including in the list of the President's 
unenumerated powers "the power to make such international agreements as do not consti­
tute treaties in the constitutional sense"). 
36. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 {1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324, 331 {1937). 
37. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. e; HENKIN, supra note 4, at 217, 
229; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, ls NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. RBv. 799, 
805 {1995); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. d ("[T]he Tenth 
Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, 
does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements.") (emphasis added). But see 
Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 
86 CAL. L. RBv. 671 (1998) (questioning the interchangeability of treaties and executive 
agreements). There is less agreement concerning the proper scope of sole executive agree· 
ments. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 222. 
38. See BARRY E. CARTER & PffiLLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 {2d ed. 
1995); LoCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 13 {1986); 
LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL PO WER IN FOREIGN 
POLICY 30-31, 105-06 (1985). 
39. For a debate during the 1940s, see Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement 
Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE LJ. 664 (1944); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and 
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but the issue may be largely academic in light of the widespread and 
now longstanding nature of the practice and Congress's acqui­
escence to it. The rise of executive agreements is relevant to the 
federalism question because the two-thirds Senate consent require­
ment in Article II, which these agreements bypass, has long been 
thought to provide special protection of states' rights.40 
B. Supreme Court's Renewed Commitment to Federalism 
As the above changes in treaty-making began to unfold after 
World War II, concerns were in fact raised regarding their potential 
impact on American federalism. These concerns were expressed 
most prominently in connection with debates in the 1950s over the 
proposed "Bricker Amendment" to the Constitution.41 This con­
troversy died out, however, in part because of the Supreme Court's 
expanded reading of Congress's commerce and other powers, be­
ginning in the New Deal era and continuing into the civil rights 
era.42 Once it became understood that the federal government had 
almost unlimited domestic lawmaking powers, the particular scope 
of the treaty power (or executive agreement power) became less 
relevant.43 Although the Supreme Court did attempt to reinvigo­
rate the Tenth Amendment in its 1976 National League decision,44 
this effort was short-lived, as a majority of the Court overruled that 
decision just nine years later in the Garcia case.45 Thus, once again, 
the Court seemed to allow the federal government essentially un­
limited lawmaking power vis-a-vis the states.46 
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National 
Policy (pts. 1 & 2), 54 YALE LJ. 181, 534 (1945); Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive 
Agreements -A Reply, 54 YALE LJ. 616 (1945). For a more recent debate, see Ackerman 
& Golove, supra note 37, and Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflec­
tions on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1223 (1995). 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 118-22, 288-89. 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 210-16. 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-17 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 
(1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-58 (1966); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968); see also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 857 (noting this 
point). 
43. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227 (2d ed. 1988); 
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 857, 898; Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the 
Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. RE.v. 903, 905 
(1959). 
44. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
45. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
46. Cf. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1485, 1487 (1994) 
(noting that Garcia made explicit what was implicit in the New Deal cases); John C. Yoo, The 
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311, 1311 (1997) (stating that "it was in 
Garcia that the Court announced that it no longer would examine the constitutionality of 
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During the 1990s, however, the Court has shown a willingness in 
a number of areas to limit the scope of Congress's domestic powers, 
and to enforce the rights of the states against federal regulation. 
For example, in New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a 
federal statute that in effect compelled state disposal of radioactive 
waste as "inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government 
established by the Constitution";47 in United States v. Lopez, the 
Court invalidated a federal statute criminalizing the possession of 
:firearms near school zones as exceeding Congress's powers under 
the Commerce Clause;48 in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court in­
validated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)49 on the 
ground that it exceeded Congress's powers under the Fourteenth 
Amendment;50 and in Printz v. United States, the Court invalidated 
a federal statute requiring state law enforcement officials to con­
duct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers as 
"compromis[ing] the structural framework of dual sovereignty."51 
The recent Court also has protected federalism in other, less direct 
ways - for example, by narrowing the situations in which Congress 
can override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit.52 
The Supreme Court's renewed commitment to protecting feder­
alism is likely to increase the importance of the scope of the treaty 
power. If the treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions, 
as the nationalist view maintains, then it may be a vehicle for the 
enactment of legislative changes that fall outside of Congress's do­
mestic lawmaking powers.53 Indeed, commentators recently have 
begun to seize on this possibility. 
federal legislation that threatened to violate the sovereignty of the states"). For additional 
discu5sion of Garcia and its reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 292-93. 
47. 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992). 
48. See 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 {1995). 
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 {1994). The statute disallowed federal or state regula­
tions that substantially burdened the exercise of religion, absent a compelling government 
interest, and even then only if the least restrictive means were used. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1. 
50. See 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 {1997). In light of Lopez, RFRA presumably could not be 
justified as an exercise of Congress's commerce powers. See Neuman, supra note 15, at 34; 
William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DuKE L.J. 291, 303 n.33 (1996). 
51. 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 {1997). 
52. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 {1996) {holding that the 
Commerce Clause cf.oes not give Congress the power to override Eleventh Amendment 
immunity). 
53. It is well settled that Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, has the power 
to implement valid treaties. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432, 435 (1920); 
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901); United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 82 {2d Cir. 
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Professor Gerald Neuman, for example, has argued that even if 
RFRA is not a valid exercise of Congress's domestic lawmaking 
powers, it can be justified constitutionally as part of this country's 
implementation of a treaty - the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).54 The ICCPR, which the United 
States ratified in 1992, contains a long list of individual rights that 
cannot be infringed by member countries. One of these rights is a 
right "to freedom of thought, conscience and religion," which the 
Convention says includes a right "to manifest [one's] religion or be­
lief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."55 The Conven­
tion also says that the only limitations that may be imposed on this 
right are those "necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."56 
Neuman makes the plausible argument that these provisions au­
thorize Congress to grant religious freedom protection such as is 
reflected in the RFRA statute.57 As for the federalism concerns 
associated with the statute, Neuman argues that "[t]he mere fact 
that the treaty may require the extension of religious exemptions 
within areas of traditional state regulation creates no obstacle to its 
validity" in light of the well-settled proposition that the treaty 
power is "free from any 'invisible radiation from the general terms 
of the Tenth Amendment.' "58 In other words, even though the 
Supreme Court has declared the RFRA statute to be "a considera­
ble congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives 
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their 
citizens,"59 this intrusion is entirely proper, says Neuman, as long as 
it is enacted pursuant to a treaty. This is what the nationalist view 
entails, and Neuman has only scratched the surface. 
1998); REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 111 cmt. j; see also U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
18 (giving Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution . . .  Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof'). 
54. See Neuman, supra note 15, at 49-53. 
55. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 18(1). 
56. Id. art. 18(3). 
57. But see Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. 
Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local 
Infringement, 20 U. Aru<:. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 633, 662 (1998) (arguing that "anything close to a 
verbatim reenactment of RFRA would appear to go well beyond what [the ICCPR] 
requires"). 
58. Neuman, supra note 15, at 46 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)). 
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997). 
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C. Other Examples 
The RFRA example is just one of many instances in which the 
treaty power might be used to overcome federalism restraints on 
domestic lawmaking. Below I consider a number of other exam­
ples, some actual and some speculative, where this issue might 
arise. 
1. Human Rights Standards 
There are numerous instances in which Congress might use 
human rights treaties to overcome federalism restraints on its law­
making power. Consider, for example, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,6° which became effective in 1990 and has now 
been ratified by almost every nation in the world. This treaty -
which the United States has signed but has not yet ratified - con­
tains a number of provisions that may be inconsistent with current 
U.S. family law.61 This inconsistency has prompted federalism con­
cems62 because family law is a subject that largely has been regu­
lated in this country at the state rather than federal level.63 
60. CRC, supra note 29. 
61. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 36-37; 
see also CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMEruCA: U.N. CONVENTION ON nm RIGHTS OF nm CHILD 
COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 
1990) (discussing various aspects of the Convention). The Convention purports to give chil­
dren both certain procedural rights as well as substantive rights concerning such things as 
expression, belief, association, privacy, education, and even a certain standard of living. See 
CRC, supra note 29, arts. 12-27. 
62. See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, International Declaration/Convention Efforts and the 
Current Status of Children's Rights in the United States, in THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAw: SoME EMERGING PROBLEMS 19, 19-21 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981) (noting the poten­
tially large inipact the Convention could have on American federalism); Susan Kilbourne, 
U.S. Failure to Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with 
Children's Rights, 6 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 437, 440-56 (1996) (discussing vari­
ous criticisms of the Convention, including those based on federalism); James J. Kilpatrick, 
Treaty on Children Adds Up to Bad Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 18, 1991, at 21A 
(criticizing the Convention as creating "the prospect of one massive federal code on the care 
and feeding of children"). For a discussion of other ways in which family law is increasingly 
becoming the subject of international agreements, see Adair Dyer, The Internationalization 
of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 625 (1997). 
63. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) ('"The whole subject of 
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
States and not to the laws of the United States."') (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 
(1890)). See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 
1821-25 (1995) (explaining this point). This is not to say that family law is completely a 
matter of state law in this country. Indeed, in recent years, family law has come to be "very 
substantially affected by federal constitutional doctrine, by federal statutes and by private law 
decisions of the federal courts." HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY, CASES AND 
PROBLEMS ON DoMESTJc RELATIONS 2 (4th ed. 1990); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism 
and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1298 (1998) (challenging "the exist­
ence of an exclusively local tradition in family law"). 
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Similar concerns have been raised with respect to the Conven­
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW),64 various sections of which "provide for the 
elimination of discrimination against women in areas of govern­
ment that have historically been considered political functions of 
the several states, such as regulation of family relations and educa­
tion. "65 The Convention includes provisions addressing, among 
other things, discrimination "in recreational activities, sports and all 
aspects of cultural life," as well as "in all matters relating to mar­
riage and family relations."66 The United States has signed but has 
not yet ratified this Convention, although the Clinton administra­
tion has been pressing the Senate for approval.67 
Still another example is the relationship between international 
law and the controversial issue of affirmative action. Some states, 
such as California, have begun to cut back on race-based and other 
affirmative action programs. 68 In response, two scholars recently 
made the claim that such affirmative action, even if no longer re­
quired as a matter of U.S. domestic law, may be mandated by 
human rights treaties to which the United States is a party.69 
2. Criminal Law and Punishment 
American criminal law, another area of law primarily regulated 
in this country at the state level, also has become the subject of 
treaty-making. For example, the statute implementing the Geno­
cide Convention makes it a federal crime to kill or cause serious 
64. CEDAW, supra note 29. 
65. Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 299, 320 (1995); see also Malvina 
Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEo. WASH. J. INn.. L. & EcoN. 49 (1997) (discussing 
proposed U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations regarding the Convention, in­
cluding proposed federalism understanding); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Pro­
posed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution be an Obstacle to 
Human Rights?, 23 HAsnNos CoNST. L.Q. 727 (1996) (describing federalism and other con­
cerns that have been raised regarding the Convention). 
66. CEDAW, supra note 29, arts. 13, 16. 
67. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Hillary Clinton, Madeleine Albright Push for Women's Pact 
Approva� BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1998, at AS. 
68. See California Civil Rights Initiative, CAL. CoNST. art. 1, § 31(a) (1996) ("The state 
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on 
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employ­
ment, public education, or public contracting."). 
69. See Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help 
Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 423 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action 
and International Law, 18 MICH. J. INn.. L. 659, 674 (1997); see also Editorial, U.N. Conven­
tion Ties U.S. to Affirmative Action, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Oct. 17, 1997, at 32 
(arguing that treaties require racial and gender affirmative action). 
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bodily harm in this country "with the specific intent to destroy, in 
whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
group as such."70 A similar example is the recently-enacted statute 
implementing the Hostage Convention, which federalizes garden­
variety kidnappings in this country whenever a foreign citizen is in­
volved.71 It is possible that statutes such as these raise federalism 
concerns, given that, "[u]nder our federal system, the 'States pos­
sess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal 
law.'"72 
Criminal punishment, especially the death penalty, presents an 
additional area of potential conflict between treaty law and federal­
ism. Despite international criticism,73 the United States is imposing 
the death penalty with increasing regularity, primarily at the state 
level. In light of recent Supreme Court precedent, it seems unlikely 
that the federal government has the power under either Article I or 
the Fourteenth Amendment to abolish state use of the death pen­
alty, assuming states are not imposing it in a manner that violates 
the Eighth Amendment.74 According to the nationalist view, how­
ever, this limitation on the federal government's power would dis­
appear if the federal government entered into a treaty outlawing 
capital punishment.75 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1994); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(noting that the statute applies to private conduct "if the crime is committed within the 
United States or by a U.S. national"). 
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). For a recent decision rejecting federalism challenges to 
this statute, see United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Lin, 
101 F.3d 760, 765-66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying the statute even though the defendant's "ac­
tions took place entirely in the District of Columbia, did not constitute international acts of 
hostage-taking .. . did not involve the United States government" and "could as well have 
supported charges under local District of Columbia law"); United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 
F.3d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "the statute is constitutional as an exercise of 
Congress' plenary powers over aliens and foreign relations"). For a discussion of the Lue 
case, see infra text accompanying notes 362-67. 
72. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (quotation marks 
omitted))). 
73. See, e.g., David Stout, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: U.S. Executions Draw Scorn from 
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, § 4 at 4 (describing some of this criticism); Elizabeth 
Olson, U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for 'Racist' Use of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, 
at Al7 (same). 
74. See Spiro, supra note 31, at 576 n.28. 
75. There is no such treaty, and the likelihood of the United States ratifying such a treaty 
is probably small. Some specific applications of the death penalty, however, are already the 
subject of treaty. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United 
States has ratified, see supra text accompanying notes 54-56, provides, among other things, 
that the "(s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." ICCPR, supra note 
29, art. 6(5). In consenting to the treaty, the Senate stated that, "subject to its Constitutional 
constraints," the United States reserves the right "to impose capital punishment on any per-
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Although involving a more traditional treaty, a recent incident 
dramatically illustrates the potential conflict between the treaty 
power and state authority to impose the death penalty. In April 
1998, the International Court of Justice in The Hague (the "ICJ") 
ordered the United States to "take all measures at its disposal" to 
stay the execution in Virginia of Angel Breard, a Paraguayan na­
tional, while the Court considered a suit brought against the United 
States by Paraguay.76 The suit alleged that Virginia had violated a 
multilateral treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,77 
by failing to advise Breard of his right to contact and request assist­
ance from the Paraguayan consulate, and that, as a result, Breard's 
conviction and sentence should be vacated.78 
In response to the ICJ's order, the State Department asked 
Virginia's governor voluntarily to stay the execution, but he refused 
to do so, stating that delaying the execution "would have the practi­
cal effect of transferring responsibility from the courts of the Com­
monwealth [of Virginia] and the United States to the International 
Court."79 The U.S. Supreme Court also refused to stay the execu­
tion, concluding that "[i]f the Governor wishes to wait for the deci­
sion of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing 
case law allows us to make that choice for him. "80 The Justice De- · 
partment, in a brief submitted to the Supreme Court, stated that 
even if the ICJ's order were binding, the federal government did 
not have the power to compel Virginia's compliance with it because 
"our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's 
ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the States. "81 
son (other than a pregnant woman) . . .  including such punishment for crimes committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age." 138 CoNG. REc. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992) (U.S. Senate 
resolution advising and consenting to ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). Cf. Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States 
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights 
Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. RE:v. 1209, 1213 n.24 (1993) (noting that "federalism 
concerns would prove no bar to the preemption of state law" by these provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
76. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 
37 I.L.M. 810, 819 (Apr. 9, 1998) (order granting request for indication of provisional 
measures). 
77. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
78. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 
37 I.L.M. 810, 814 (Apr. 9, 1998) (order granting request for indication of provisional 
measures). 
79. Co=onwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Gov­
ernor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14, 1998). 
80. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998). 
81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 
(1998) (No. 97-1390). 
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A number of commentators, by contrast, have argued that, in light 
of Holland, such federalism limits were not applicable.82 
3. Commerce and Trade 
Commercial and other private law treaties also have the poten­
tial to intrude on traditional state prerogatives. As one commenta­
tor recently explained, "[a]t issue in the ratification process . . .  is 
nothing less than federal arrogation of traditional state competence 
in the law governing private, and in particular commercial, rela­
tions."83 The United States already is a party to the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 84 This Convention 
governs the sale of goods in a variety of international contract situa­
tions, although contracting parties are allowed to opt out of its pro­
visions. 85 In this country, the Convention is considered a self­
executing treaty, and thus, when it applies, it preempts inconsistent 
state law, including the Uniform Commercial Code.86 
Another sector of private law that may become the subject of a 
treaty is the enforcement of judgments. A number of countries, in­
cluding the United States, currently are negotiating a proposed 
multilateral treaty, in connection with The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, that would establish uniform standards 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 87 This is 
a subject that has been regulated in this country primarily by the 
states,88 and commentators expressed concern as late as the 1950s 
that a treaty on this subject might exceed federal power.89 A simi-
82. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 
92 AM. J. INTL. L. 679 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to 
Require Compliance with [CJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INTL. L. 683 (1998). 
83. Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 690 
(1998). 
. 
84. See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter Conference on Con· 
tracts']. The United States became a party to this treaty in 1988. 
85. See Conference on Contracts', supra note 84, at 671. 
86. See, e.g., Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Ftlanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Intl. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis· 
missed, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993). 
87. See generally Symposium, Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doc­
trine?, 61 ALBANY L. REv. 1159-1307 (1998) (discussing proposed multilateral convention 
governing jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments); Symposium, Enforcing Judgments' 
Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOKLYN J. INTL. L. 1-220 (1998) (same). 
88. See GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LmGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTS 
938-39 (3d ed. 1996). 
89. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests': The Federal Government and Inter· 
national Efforts' to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 323, 359-60 (1954); see also 
Charles Evans Hughes, The Outlook for Pan Americanism - Some Observations on the Sixth 
International Conference of American States, 22 PROC. AM. SoCY. INTL. L. 1, 12 (1928) (ex-
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lar example is the Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession 
to the Estates of Deceased Persons,90 which would establish choice 
of law rules concerning inheritance issues. This "Convention would 
seem to change hallowed rules of U.S. state law without the scru­
tiny that such a change would get in a state legislature."91 
An additional example in commercial law is the protection of 
intellectual property, a subject increasingly regulated by treaty.92 
Intellectual property protection is governed extensively in this 
country by federal law, but there are recognized limits to the scope 
of permissible federal protection.93 This has prompted one com­
mentator recently to wonder whether, in light of Holland, the fed­
eral government could by treaty confer stronger intellectual 
property rights than it would otherwise have the power to do pursu­
ant to its domestic lawmaking powers.94 
Federalism concerns also exist with respect to the GATI and 
NAFfA trade agreements, which were concluded by the President 
by means of executive agreements rather than the Article II treaty 
process.95 Both of these agreements contain provisions that affect 
pressing doubts regarding the ability of the United States to enter into a treaty concerning 
private international law). But cf. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 471-72 n.87 ("Today, few would 
accept - on any theory - the conclusion . . .  that the United States could not adhere to a 
convention establishing uniform principles of private international law."). 
90. Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, 
Aug. 1, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 150. 
91. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 38, at 175; see also Jeffrey Schoenblum, Choice of 
Law and Succession to Wealth: A Critical Analysis of the Ramifications of the Hague Conven­
tion on Succession to Decedent's Estates, 32 VA. J. lNn.. L. 82 (1991) (discussing and criticiz­
ing the Convention). 
92. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of 
Globalism, 37 VA. J. lNn.. L. 505, 546-49 (1997) (discussing some of the treaties in this area). 
93. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(holding that, under the Copyright Clause, Congress has the power to confer copyright pro­
tection only on original works). 
94. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. lNn.. L. 369, 422 
n.302 (1997); see also Lawrence Lessig & Pamela Samuelson, In Defiance of the Public 
Interest, WASH. PoST, July 13, 1998, at A21 (arguing that proposed implementing legislation 
for a recent intellectual property treaty "would throw this constitutional balance [between 
the need for encouraging creativity and the public interest in having access to knowledge and 
innovation] out of kilter"); cf. Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally 
Mandated Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 Aruz. ST. L.J. 
1461, 1465-68 (1992) (relying on Holland by analogy to argue that Congress can enact copy­
right legislation pursuant to its commerce powers that it could not enact pursuant to its Copy­
right Clause powers). 
95. See generally George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in 
Regional Integration, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 463, 466-67 (1998); Friedman, supra note 2, at 1453-
60; David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY RoUND 175 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997); 
Samuel C. Straight, Note, GAIT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the 
Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216 (1995). 
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state regulatory authority.96 Objections were made to the latest 
GATI agreement, for example, on the ground that it "impinged on 
matters that had been, and are generally, governed by state law, 
such as product-safety regulation, banking and insurance, and local 
'tax breaks' and other subsidy practices."97 Similarly, one commen­
tator recently noted that the agreement may override state voter 
initiatives concerning the labeling of products.98 
4. Environmental Protection 
The potential conflict between the treaty power and federalism 
is also evident in the area of environmental protection. The United 
States is a party to a number of treaties relating to the environment, 
some of which Congress has invoked or could invoke as a basis for 
its enactment of federal environmental legislation. In enacting the 
Endangered Species Act,99 for example, Congress cited as a basis 
for its authority various treaties including the Convention on Na­
ture Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemi­
sphere.100 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States 
v. Lopez, it is arguable that some of these statutes, or at least cer­
tain applications of them, exceed Congress's powers under the com­
merce clause.101 If so, the constitutionality of these statutes may 
depend on the validity of the nationalist view of the treaty power.102 
96. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1454·60. 
97. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 168; see also William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty?: The 
Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INTI.. L.J. 427, 469 (1995) 
(noting that "[t]he implications of [the latest GAIT agreement] on state law are significant"); 
Friedman, supra note 2, at 1454 ("In sharp contrast to prior negotiations, the Uruguay Round 
of the GAIT adopted rules in many areas that will affect state regulatory authority."). 
98. See James T. O'Reilly, Stop the World, We Want Our Own Labels: Treaties, State 
Voter Initiative Laws, and Federal Pre-emption, 18 U. PA. J. INTL. EcoN. L. 617 (1997). The 
NAFrA and GAIT implementing statutes do take account of federalism concerns to some 
extent, in that they provide for a federal-state consultation process and allow only the federal 
government to challenge a state law as being in violation of the agreements. See 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3312 {1994) {NAFrA); 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994) (GAIT). 
99. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1994)). 
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a); S. REP. No. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2989, 2994. Another example is the statute at issue in Holland - the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act - which implements the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds. See infra 
text accompanying notes 187-88. 
101. To date, however, courts generally have rejected commerce clause challenges to fed­
eral environmental statutes. See, e.g., National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 
1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding provision in Endangered Species Act); United States 
v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding application of the Comprehen­
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); United States v. Bramble, 
103 F.3d 1475, 1480-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Eagle Protection Act). 
102. See generally Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and 
Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 
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Finally, consider the "commandeering" regulations invalidated 
by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States103 and Printz v. 
United States.104 It is not inconceivable that the federal government 
would conclude treaties addressing the subject matter of those cases 
- disposal of radioactive waste and background checks for hand­
gun ownership. Indeed, although not directly on point, the United 
States recently signed a treaty that provides that the parties to it 
"shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish 
as criminal offenses under their domestic law the illicit manufactur­
ing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other 
related materials."105 According to the nationalist view, the ratifi­
cation of relevant treaties presumably would allow Congress to re­
enact the provisions invalidated in New York and Printz, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's determination that they in­
truded too deeply on state sovereignty.106 
* * * 
I do not mean to suggest that any of these examples necessarily 
should be viewed as an improper exercise of the treaty power. I 
mention them rather because they highlight the increasing tension 
between international law and this country's federalist system. In 
light of this tension, the relationship between the treaty power and 
American federalism merits reexamination. 
II. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TREATY POWER 
Proponents of the nationalist view of the treaty power some­
times rely on history to support their claims. In particular, they ar­
gue that the Founders did not intend either a states'-rights or a 
subject matter limitation on the treaty power and that the Supreme 
Court repeatedly rejected such limitations during the nineteenth 
TEXAS L. REv. 1125 (1998) (arguing that the treaty power is currently the strongest source of 
authority supporting the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act). 
103. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
104. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
105. Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, adopted Nov. 14, 1997, art. 
IV, para. 1, 37 I.L.M. 143, 146 (1998); see also Raymond Bonner, U.N. Panel May Approve 
Limit on Guns Despite N.R.A. Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at A9 (describing a United 
Nations proposal to reduce trade in firearms). 
106. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 15, at 52; Leebron, supra note 95, at 225 n.193; cf. 
Tribe, supra note 39, at 1260. But see HENKIN, supra note 4, at 467 n.75 (assuming, without 
explanation, that this could not be done by treaty). 
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century.101 In fact, the historical record reveals a fairly consistent 
understanding that the treaty power was limited either by subject 
matter, states' rights, or both. This historical record may not by 
itself require contemporary rejection of the nationalist view, but it 
does undermine any strong historical claims for that view. 
A. Founding Period 
In the materials relating to the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution, the only substantial discussions of the scope of the 
treaty power are contained in the records of the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention. Neither the records of the Federal Convention nor the 
Federalist Papers contain much discussion of this issue. Rather, the 
references to treaties in these materials primarily concern the pro­
cess by which the federal government would conclude treaties and 
the proper governmental actors to be involved in this process.108 
Thus, for example, there was debate over whether to include the 
House of Representatives in the treaty process and over what pro­
portion of the Senate should be required to approve a treaty.109 
Several general themes do emerge even from these materials, 
however, that may be relevant to the scope of the treaty power. 
First, the Founders believed that treaties should be difficult to 
make. As Professor Henkin explains, "the prevailing mood at the 
Convention was that it should not be too easy to make treaties. 
Even the 'nationalists' among the Framers neither desired nor ex­
pected many treaties."110 Thus, Gouverneur Morris observed that 
"[t]he more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set 
107. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 189-94. 
108. See generally Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making 
and Abrogation of Treaties - The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Histori­
cally Examined, 55 WASH. L. REv. 1, 79-132 {1979); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional 
Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. (n.s.) 233, 241-43 
{1984); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 
229, 253-68 (1990); see also Shackelford Miller, The Treaty Making Power, 41 AM. L. REv. 
527, 529 (1907) ("At no time • . •  did the convention discuss the scope or extent of the power; 
it merely considered the question as to where the power should be lodged - who should 
exercise it. The same is true as to the 'Federalist' • . . •  "); L.L. Thompson, State Sovereignty 
and the Treaty-Making Power, 11 CAL. L. REv. 242, 250 (1923) ("The members of the Consti­
tutional Convention seem to have been concerned primarily with the question of who would 
exercise the treaty-making power."). 
109. See, e.g., DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 [hereinafter DEBATES], 
reprinted in 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 469, 470 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888); Notes of James 
Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 392-
93 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937); Notes of James Madison (Sept. 7, 1787), in 2 RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 538; SUPPLEMENT TO MAx FARRAND'S THE 
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 262 (James H. Hutson ed. 1987) [hereinafter SUP· 
PLEMENT]; see generally Bestor, supra note 108, at 93, 97-98, 109-10. 
110. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 442 n.2. 
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on them,"111 and James Madison noted that it had been too easy to 
make treaties under the Articles of Confederation.112 This theme 
was echoed in the state ratification debates. During the 
Pennsylvania Convention, James Wilson, in commenting on the 
likely workload of the Senate, stated that the treaty power "should 
be very seldom exercised - . . .  it will be but once in a number of 
years, that a single treaty will come before the senate."113 
Second, the Founders contemplated that treaties would govern 
truly inter-national relations. The categories of treaties mentioned 
by the Founders concerned issues such as "war, peace, and com­
merce."114 Even Alexander Hamilton, who was no great defender 
of states' rights, emphasized in The Federalist that treaties are "not 
rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements be­
tween sovereign and sovereign."115 This understanding was a natu­
ral adjunct of the Founders' belief that there was a clear distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs. Indeed, it is this distinction 
that helped ensure, in the Founders' minds, that the national gov­
ernment's power would be limited and, correspondingly, that states' 
rights would be protected.116 As Professor Zechariah Chafee has 
explained: "The vital distinction between foreign affairs and do­
mestic matters was taken for granted throughout [the drafting of 
the Constitution]. Indeed, this distinction was ingrained in their 
minds long before they met in Philadelphia."117 
111. Notes of James Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN­
TION, supra note 109, at 393. 
112. See Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoN­
VENTION, supra note 109, at 548; see also Quincy Wright, The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13 
AM. J. hm.. L. 242, 242 (1919) ("The framers of the American Constitution did not antici­
pate or desire the conclusion of many treaties."). 
113. James Wilson, Summation and Fmal Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CoNSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETrERS 
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 831, 851 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993); accord 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (July 18, 1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 38-39 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905) ("On the subject of treaties, our 
system is to have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided."). 
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also, e.g., 
THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 42 (James Madison), at 265 (referring to the "power of making 
commercial treaties"); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 109, at 392-93 
(references to treaties of alliance). 
115. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 450-51. 
116. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 45 (James Madison), at 292 (stating 
that the national government's powers "will be exercised principally on external objects, as 
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce"). 
117. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REv. 
345, 368 (1952). 
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Third, the Founders placed substantial emphasis on the role of 
the Senate in protecting states' rights.118 Among other things, they 
noted that each state was to have equal representation in the 
Senate and that the senators would be elected by state legisla­
tures.119 Based on this, they reasoned that state interests would be 
safeguarded in the treaty process by assigning the treaty power to 
the Senate.120 In carrying out its state-protecting role, the Founders 
envisioned that the Senate would be actively involved with the 
President in the process of negotiating and concluding treaties.121 
Indeed, the Founders envisioned that the Senate would act as "a 
council-like body in direct and continuous consultation with the 
Executive on matters of foreign policy."122 
Fourth, supporters of the Constitution repeatedly expressed the 
view that the Constitution delegated only limited powers to the na­
tional government. Perhaps most famously, Madison stated in 
Federalist No. 45 that "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite."123 The Federalist proponents of the Constitution 
thought this proposition so evident that it precluded the need for a 
Bill of Rights.124 There is no evidence that the Founders believed 
the treaty power to be exempt from this general proposition. 
118. See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs oF THE FEDERAL 
CoNVENTION, supra note 109, at 392; DEBATES, supra note 109, at 137-38. 
119. See, e.g., DEBATES, supra note 109, at 507; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 64 
(John Jay), at 395; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 45 (James Madison), at 291; see 
generally Rakove, supra note 108, at 257. 
120. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 64 (John Jay), at 395; see generally 
Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 CoLuM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 434 
(1975) (discussing and documenting this point). 
121. See THE DEBATES IN THE CoNVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, reprinted 
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 109, at 415, 507; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 64 
(John Jay), at 392-93; see generally HENKIN, supra note 4, at 177; JACK N. RAKOVE, Orum­
NAL MEANINGS 266 (1996); Rakove, supra note 108, at 257. 
122. Arthur Bestor, "Advice" from the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End is 
Achieved, 83 AM. J. !NTL. L. 718, 726 (1989); see also HENKIN, supra note 4, at 177 (making 
similar point). In response to concerns that the treaty process would be too dominated by the 
states, the Founders emphasized that state influence over treaties would be counterbalanced 
by the President's role in the treaty process and by the role of the House of Representatives 
in implementing and appropriating money for treaties. See John Yoo, Some Notes on the 
Framing of the Treaty Clause (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
123. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 45 (James Madison), at 292; see also RAKOVE, 
supra note 121, at 242 ("It was crucial to the formulation of the Federalist position that the 
objects of national legislation were at once vital but limited - that is, that they embraced the 
most important res publica while leaving the mundane affairs that preoccupied most Ameri­
cans to the states."). 
124. See RAKoVE, supra note 121, ch. X; CHARLES PINCKNEY, SPEECH IN SoUTII CARO· 
LINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1788), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON· 
VENTION, supra note 109, at 256; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 84 (Alexander 
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In addition to reiterating these general themes, the records of 
the Virginia Ratifying Convention contain specific discussions of 
the scope of the treaty power.125 These discussions confirm that the 
Founders did in fact envision limitations on the treaty power. Dur­
ing the Virginia convention, Anti-Federalists like Patrick Henry 
charged that under the proposed Constitution, the treaty-makers 
could "make any treaty . . . .  as they please."126 In response, Feder­
alist defenders of the Constitution strenuously denied that the 
treaty power was unlimited. Madison stated, for example: "The ex­
ercise of the power must be consistent with the object of the delega­
tion . . . .  The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with 
foreign nations, and is extemal."127 He further explained that the 
Founders had not specified the proper subject matters of treaties in 
order to preserve flexibility, not because the power was unlim­
ited.128 Consistent with this view, Edmund Randolph remarked 
that "neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular 
right of any state, can be affected by a treaty."1�9 And, perhaps 
most broadly, George Nicholas stated that no treaty could be made 
"which shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or incon­
sistent with the delegated powers. "130 Thus, when the question of the 
treaty power's scope was specifically discussed, the Founders did 
express the view that it was subject to constitutional limitations. As 
Charles Lofgren has explained, "[t]hose Virginia Federalists who 
Hamilton); see also Kramer, supra note 46, at 1495 ("[T]here does seem to have been wide 
consensus on a few issues, among them that the powers of the national government were to 
be limited and that courts would play a role in policing the limits."). 
125. Statements made during the state ratifying conventions are important evidence of 
the original understanding of the Constitution - perhaps an even more important source of 
original meaning than the statements made during the Constitutional Convention. See 
RAKOVE, supra note 121, at 16-18; see also James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty (April 4, 
1796), in VI THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 263, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) ("If we 
were to look . . .  for the meaning of the [Constitution] beyond the face of the instrument, we 
must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conven­
tions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution."). 
126. THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE CoMMONWEALTII OF VIRGINIA, re­
printed in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 109, at 513 [hereinafter VIRGINIA DEBATES]; see 
also, e.g., id. at 509 ("The President and Senate can make any treaty whatsoever.") (state­
ment of George Mason). There were similar Anti-Federalist statements in the press. See, 
e.g., LETTER IV FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITU­
TION, supra note 113, at 276 (asserting that the treaty power is "absolute"). 
127. VmGINIA DEBATES, supra note 126, at 514. 
128. See id. at 514-15; see also ABRAHAM BALDWIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
(March 14, 1796), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 109, at 
370 (explaining that the Founders purposely left the treaty clause "a little ambiguous and 
uncertain"). 
129. VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 126, at 504. 
130. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). 
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discussed the issue thus perceived constitutional limits to treaties 
beyond the minimal requirements that they be properly made. "131 
Statements made shortly after the ratification period, although 
not technically part of the original understanding, may nevertheless 
shed light on that understanding. It is significant, therefore, that 
the views expressed by the Federalists during the Virginia Conven­
tion were reiterated in the subsequent debates in 1796 over whether 
the House of Representatives had the power to inquire into the 
making of the Jay Treaty. This treaty - the first adopted by the 
United States after ratification of the Constitution - was between 
the United States and Great Britain and was negotiated by John Jay 
while he was serving concurrently as Minister to Great Britain and 
Chief Justice of the United States.132 The treaty addressed, among 
other things, the withdrawal of military forces from American and 
British territories, indemnification of war-time creditors, and cer­
tain boundary disputes. The treaty was extremely controversial in 
the United States because, among other things, it was perceived by 
many people as being too conciliatory to the British. In 1796, 
President Washington asked the House of Representatives to ap­
propriate funds to implement the Treaty. In response, the Republi­
cans in the House introduced a resolution asking the President to 
provide the House with the executive papers reflecting the negoti­
ating history of the treaty.133 
During the debates over this resolution, numerous representa­
tives expressed the view that the treaty power was limited in scope. 
James Hillhouse, for example, stated that a treaty must relate "to 
objects within the province of the Treaty-making power, a power 
131. CliARLEs A. LoFGREN, "GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE" 151 
(1986); see also id. (noting that the Virginia ratification debates reflected "the view that trea­
ties would be restricted to foreign objects {but with recognition that this was an expansive 
category)"). This is not to say that the Federalists were all of one mind on this issue. Hamil­
ton, in particular, seems to have had a very expansive {although not unlimited) view of the 
treaty power. In a letter to George Washington in 1795, he stated: "A treaty cannot be made 
which alters the constitutions of the country, or which infringes any express exceptions to the 
power of the Constitution of the United States. But it is difficult to assign any other bounds 
to the power." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (July 9, 1795), in 5 
THE WoRKS OF ALExANoER IlAMILToN 158-59 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904). 
132. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 
Stat. 116. 
133. After substantial debate, the resolution passed 62-37. Washington nevertheless re­
fused to turn over the papers. See Message from George Washington to the House of Repre­
sentatives of the United States {Mar. 30, 1796), in 1 A CoMPlLATION OF THE MEssAoES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 187 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). For an excel­
lent discussion of the negotiation of the Jay Treaty and the House debates, see STANLEY M. 
ELKINS & Eruc L. McKrrruCK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM, ch. IX {1993); see also SAMUEL F. 
BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY JN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (rev. ed. 1962); JERALD A. 
COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970). 
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which is not unlimited."134 He further stated that "[t]he objects 
upon which it can operate are understood and well defined, and if 
the Treaty-making power were to embrace other objects, their do­
ings would have no more binding force than if the Legislature were 
to assume and exercise judicial powers under the name of legisla­
tion."135 Other representatives making similar statements included 
Daniel Buck,136 James Madison,137 Theodore Sedgwick,138 and Sa­
muel Smith.139 Importantly, Madison observed that a "candid and 
collected view" of the state ratification debates made clear that the 
treaty-making power had been understood as being limited in 
scope.140 
Restrictions on the treaty power also were made a part of the 
Senate's Manual of Parliamentary Procedure, drafted by Thomas 
Jefferson between 1797 and 1801, when he was Vice-President (and 
thus President of the Senate).141 In the Manual, Jefferson noted 
that the Constitution did not define "[t]o what subject this power 
extends" and that the Founders were not "entirely agreed among 
ourselves" on this issue.142 He explained that the treaty power was 
nevertheless impliedly limited in at least four ways. First, it had to 
"concern the foreign nation party to the contract."143 Second, it 
covered "only those subjects which are usually regulated by 
treaty."144 Third, it did not cover "the rights reserved to the states; 
for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the 
whole government is interdicted from doing in any way."145 Fourth, 
it did not apply to "those subjects of legislation in which [the Con-
134. 5 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS 660 (1796). 
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 432 ("[I]f the PRESIDENT has assumed powers not delegated to him by the 
people in making and proclaiming this Treaty, it is void in itself . . . .  "). 
137. See id. at 671 (stating that "it is a sound rule of construction that what is forbidden to 
be done by all the branches of Government conjointly, cannot be done by one or more of 
them separately"). 
138. See id. at 516 ("The power of treating between independent nations might be classed 
under the following heads: 1. To compose and adjust differences, whether to terminate or to 
prevent war. 2. To form contracts for mutual security or defence; or to make Treaties, offen­
sive or defensive. 3. To regulate an intercourse for mutual benefit, or to form Treaties of 
commerce."). 
139. See id. at 597 ("The 'Ireaty power is in its nature limited."). 
140. See id. at 777. 
141. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the 
Senate of the United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 420, 420 (Wtlbur S. 
Howell ed., 1988). 
142. Id. at 420. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 420-21. 
145. Id. at 421. 
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stitution] gave a participation to the House of Representatives."146 
Jefferson's fourth suggested limitation - that the treaty power did 
not apply to matters that could otherwise be regulated by Congress 
- "has been consistently rejected."147 But both the subject matter 
and federalism limitations he suggested appear to have been consis­
tent with the prevailing views of the time.148 
Early opinions of the Attorney General also suggested limita­
tions on the treaty power. An 1819 opinion from the Attorney 
General, for example, stated that the federal government could not 
alter by treaty state inheritance law concerning real property.149 
And an 1831 opinion stated that the federal government is "under a 
constitutional obligation to respect [the reserved powers of the 
states] in the formation of treaties."150 Other government officials, 
by contrast, endorsed a subject matter rather than states'-rights lim­
itation on the treaty power. John Calhoun, for example, stated in 
1816 (while he was a member of the House of Representatives) that 
treaties were proper as long as they "concern[ ] our foreign 
relations. "151 
The belief that there were subject matter or federalism limita­
tions on the treaty power also was reflected in the views of early 
constitutional scholars. William Rawle stated that the treaty power 
was appropriate only for those subjects "which properly arise from 
intercourse with foreign nations," and he listed those subjects as 
"peace, alliance, commerce, neutrality, and others of a similar na­
ture. "152 Joseph Story stated in his constitutional law treatise that, 
"though the [treaty] power is thus general and unrestricted, it is not 
to be so construed, as to destroy the fundamental laws of the state" 
146. Id. 
147. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 813; see also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CON· 
TROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 102-03 (1922). It is possible, however, that John 
Calhoun agreed with Jefferson on this point. See infra note 151. But see HENKIN, supra note 
4, at 397 (arguing that Calhoun simply meant to say "that treaties cannot legislate directly"). 
148. See George A. Fmch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United 
States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 AM. J. INTI.. L. 57, 61 (1954) ("Jefferson's views un­
doubtedly represented the consensus of the Founding Fathers."). 
149. See 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 275 (1819). Contrast this with the Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, discussed supra text ac­
companying notes 90-91. 
150. 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 437 (1831). 
151. 29 ANNALS OF CoNGRESs 531 (1816). Calhoun also stated, perhaps echoing 
Jefferson, that "[a] treaty never can legitimately do that which can be done by law." Id. at 
532. Calhoun later went on to serve as Secretary of War under President Monroe, Vice­
President under Presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, U.S. Senator, and Sec­
retary of State under President 'fyler. 
152. WrLLIAM RAWLE, A VIEw oF nm CONSTITUTION oF nm UNITED STATES 57-58 
(1825). 
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and "cannot supersede, or interfere with any other of [the Constitu­
tion's] fundamental provisions."153 Subsequent nineteenth-century 
constitutional scholars echoed these comments.154 As some of 
these scholars explained, the Founders did not enumerate subject 
matter limitations on the treaty power in order to preserve flexibil­
ity, not because they thought the power unlimited.155 
In sum, although the primary focus of the Founders' attention 
was on the treaty process rather than on the scope of the treaty 
power, when they addressed that issue the Founders, as well as 
early scholars and government officials, made clear that the treaty 
power was not unlimited in scope. In particular, there appears to 
have been an understanding that the treaty power was limited 
either by subject matter, by the reserved powers of the states, or 
both. It could hardly have been otherwise, for, as noted above, the 
Constitution was viewed as delegating limited powers to the federal 
government.156 Without subject matter or federalism restrictions 
on the treaty power, the federal government would have had essen­
tially unrestricted authority vis-a-vis the states, thereby contra­
dicting one of the core assumptions of the Founders.151 
153. 3 JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1502 (1833). By "state," Story appears to have been referring to the U.S. nation-state rather 
than the constituent U.S. states. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL StiPREMACY: TREATY 
PowER vs. STATE POWER 97 (1913). Nevertheless, his belief that the treaty power was lim­
ited by the "fundamental laws" of this country and the "fundamental provisions" of the Con­
stitution presumably included a belief that the treaty power was limited by states' rights. This 
belief would be consistent with Story's view of the Constitution as "an instrument of limited 
and enumerated powers." 3 STORY, supra, § 1900. 
154. See, e.g., THOMAS M. CooLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 117 (3d ed. 1898) (stating that the treaty power "is 
subject to the implied restriction that nothing can be done under it which changes the consti­
tution of the country, or robs a department of the government or any of the States of its 
constitutional authority"); 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373 
n.1 (1895) (noting that the treaty power is subject to those limitations "arising from the na­
ture of the government itself and of that of the States"); 2 JoHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 727 (1899) (arguing that the treaty power does not 
allow regulation of the "internal concerns of the country"); HERMANN VON HoLST, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 202-03 (Alfred Bishop Mason 
trans. 1887) ("As to the extent of the treaty-power, the constitution says nothing, but it evi­
dently cannot be unlimited . . . .  It is certain that no authority granted by the constitution to 
any of the factors of government can be withdrawn from it by treaty."). 
155. See, e.g., RAWLE, supra note 152, at 57-58; see also WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, 
OUTLINES OF THE CoNSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 136 (1833). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24. 
157. Several early twentieth-century commentators stated this point well. See HENRY ST. 
GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITU­
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 123, at 140 (1915) ("The argument is irresistible that if the 
whole scheme and genius of the Constitution was to save the ungranted powers of the States 
from interference by the Federal Government, that the Framers of the Constitution would 
not have secured these against the ravages of all departments of the Government, and then 
quietly bestowed upon one of its branches, the treaty-power, the power to absorb them all."); 
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B. Nineteenth-Century Understanding 
Proponents of a broad view of the treaty power sometimes also 
rely on nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions. They argue 
that, even if the Founding materials might support limitations on 
the treaty power, the Supreme Court repudiated such limitations 
during the nineteenth century. Professor Henkin, for example, as­
serts that any federalism limitation on the treaty power was "re­
peatedly rejected by the Supreme Court" in the nineteenth 
century.158 In fact, while it is true that the Supreme Court in the 
nineteenth century upheld the validity of a number of treaties, the 
Court frequently expressed the view that the treaty power was lim­
ited either by subject matter, states' rights, or both. In addition, this 
assumption appears to have been shared by the treaty makers 
themselves. 
The Supreme Court never held in the nineteenth century that 
the treaty power was immune from federalism limitations. It did 
emphasize, as Henkin and others have pointed out, that treaties are 
supreme over state law.159 This proposition is, of course, evident 
from the constitutional text.160 To say that treaties are supreme 
federal law, however, is not to say that the treaty power is unlimited 
in scope. As one early twentieth-century scholar explained: 
"[W]hile many of the decisions contain broad general statements to 
1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
67 (1910) ("To accept [a plenary treaty power) would be at once to overturn the long line of 
decisions that have held the United States Government to be one of limited, enumerated 
powers."); William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and 
Senate of the United States (pt. 2), 57 U. PA. L. R:sv. 528, 536 (1909) (arguing that it makes no 
sense to conclude that the states reserved rights against the exercise of legislative power -
which is done by the House, Senate, and President combined - "while at the same time 
surrendering their most vital powers of self-government to two of the same three depart­
ments of the same government"). 
158. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 190; see also, e.g., 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE 
TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 6-62 (1902); CORWIN, supra note 153, at 
131-32; John B. Whitton & J. Edward Fowler, Bricker Amendment - Fallacies and Dangers, 
48 AM. J. lNn.. L. 23, 34 (1954). 
159. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 483-89 (1879); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 
(3 Cranch) 454, 457-58 (1806); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (Chase, J.). 
160. See U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A)ll treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .  "). Moreover, 
the drafting history of the Constitution makes clear that the Founders envisioned that, under 
the new Constitution, treaties would be binding on the states. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, 
supra note 114, No. 22 (Alexander Hanrllton), at 151; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 
3 (John Jay), at 43-44; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 38 (James Madison), at 238. 
Indeed, "(t]he inability of the central government under the Articles of Confederation to 
secure compliance by the states with the nation's treaty obligations was among the principal 
animating causes of the Framers' decision to establish a new government under a new Consti· 
tution, rather than simply amend the Articles of Confederation." Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 CowM. L. R:sv. 1082, 1102 (1992). 
November 1998] Treaty Power and Federalism 419 
the effect that treaties are the supreme law of the land, there is 
always the accompanying qualification that it must be a constitu­
tional treaty, in order to be so considered."161 Indeed, such a limita­
tion was essential given the Court's repeated reaffirmation during 
this period, both before and after the Civil War, that the powers of 
the federal government are limited and enumerated.162 
Consistent with this proposition, the Court in numerous cases 
stated that the treaty power was limited in scope. Some of the 
Court's decisions suggest a subject matter limitation on the treaty 
power. Thus, for example, the Court stated in several decisions that 
treaties must concern "proper subjects of negotiation."163 In other 
decisions, the Court suggested a states' -rights limitation. Perhaps 
the best example is the Court's decision in New Orleans v. United 
States.164 In that case, the United States had by treaty acquired the 
province of Louisiana from France, which had in tum acquired it 
from Spain. Prior to the treaty, the King of Spain had held certain 
public properties in the City of New Orleans in trust for the City. 
The issue was whether, pursuant to the treaty, the federal govern­
ment had acquired similar trust rights over the properties, or 
whether the properties instead were now fully in the control of the 
City. In holding that the City had control, the Court explained that 
the federal government "is one of limited powers" and that its au­
thority cannot be "enlarged under the treaty-making power."165 
The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause did not encompass 
the trust power that had been exercised by the King of Spain and 
that "the treaty cannot give this power to the federal 
government. "166 
Similar statements, albeit often in dicta, are found in other 
Supreme Court decisions during this period.167 Moreover, a 
161. Miller, supra note 108, at 544; see also, e.g., Hauenstein, 100 U.S. at 490 (acknowledg­
ing that "[t]here are doubtless limitations of this power"). 
162. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1882); Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 
(20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836); 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
163. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1890); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889); 
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872). 
164. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662. 
165. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 736. 
166. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 737. 
167. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. at 267 (noting that the treaty power is subject to 
those limitations "arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States"); 
Prevost v. Grenaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1, 7 (1856) ("[C]ertainly a treaty . . .  could not divest 
rights of property already vested in the State."); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 
466 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) ("[A]ny treaty or law of Congress invading [a power 
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number of decisions during this period suggested both a subject 
matter and a states' -rights limitation on the treaty power. In a case 
involving the power of a state to extradite a person to a foreign 
country, for example, the Court stated that the treaty power covers 
"all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse of nations had 
usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty; and which are 
consistent with the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of 
powers between the general and state governments."168 Similarly, in 
a case involving a land treaty with the Cherokee Indi�s, the Court 
stated that treaties may deal with "all those objects which in the 
intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper sub­
jects of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the nature of 
our government and the relation between the States and the United 
States. "169 
Despite this language, proponents of a broad view of the treaty 
power point out that the Court upheld treaties during this period 
that concerned matters typically regulated by the states. Most nota­
bly, the Court upheld a number of treaties giving foreigners certain 
property rights equal to those enjoyed by citizens.17° These treaties 
did intrude to some extent on state regulation of property owner­
ship, and federalism concerns sometimes were invoked in opposi­
tion to these treaties.171 But the treaties did not purport to regulate 
the relationship between states and their own citizens, or even citi­
zens from other states in the nation. They regulated only the treat­
ment of aliens, in return for similar treatment of U.S. citizens 
residing abroad. In that sense, the treaties were quite naturally 
viewed as regulating this country's inter-national relations. As one 
court explained, after reviewing these cases: "If there is one object 
more than another which belongs to our political relations, and 
which ought to be the subject of treaty regulations, it is the exten­
sion of this comity which is so highly favored by the liberal spirit of 
the age, and so conducive in its tendency to the peace and amity of 
nations."172 
reserved by the States] . . .  would be a usurpation of power."); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 
How.) 504, 613 (1847) (Daniel, J., concurring) ("Treaties, to be valid, must be made within 
the scope of the [delegated] powers."). 
168. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (emphasis added). 
169. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) (emphasis added). 
170. See, e.g., Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181, 189 (1825); Hughes v. Edwards, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489, 489 (1824); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453, 453 (1819); 
Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 262 (1817). 
171. See infra text accompanying notes 173-76. 
172. People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381, 384-85 (1855). 
November 1998] Treaty Power and Federalism 421 
Even in the context of these treaties, the U.S. treaty makers ex­
pressed concern regarding states' rights, and in a number of in­
stances acted to protect such rights. Ralston Hayden has 
documented how, between 1830 and 1860, "the Senate and the ex­
ecutive entertained grave and increasing doubts concerning their 
authority to make treaties" concerning rights to real property and 
how "in every particular instance in which conflict arose the treaty 
in question was amended to bring it more nearly into accord with 
the states' rights theory."173 Thus, for example, he explains that, 
when President Fillmore submitted a proposed treaty between the 
United States and Switzerland to the Senate in 1850, he asked for 
and obtained amendments from the Senate to protect the reserved 
powers of the States.174 William Mikell similarly has documented 
several instances in the nineteenth century when the treaty makers 
made treaties contingent on state agreement.175 He describes, for 
example, an 1853 Consular Convention with France, in which the 
provision giving a property right to French citizens was made con­
tingent on state laws permitting such a right. As for those states 
that did not permit such a right, "the President engage[ d] to recom­
mend to them the passage of such laws as may be necessary for the 
purpose of conferring this right."176 
In the early part of the twentieth century, perhaps prompted by 
the increasingly active role of the United States in international 
trade and international politics, there was substantial debate over 
whether the treaty power was limited by the reserved powers of the 
states. Scholars lined up on both sides of this issue. The most 
prominent supporters of the states' -rights view included Henry St. 
George Tucker, John Bassett Moore, and William Mikell.177 The 
most prominent opponents of this view included Charles Butler, 
Edward Corwin, and Quincy Wright.178 Few of the opponents of 
173. Ralston Hayden, The States' Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. 
HIST. REv. 566, 585 (1917). 
174. See id. at 575-76. 
175. See Mikell, supra note 157, at 555-56. 
176. CONSULAR CoNVENTION OF 1853, art. VII, reprinted in 1 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, 
lNTERNATIONAL Acrs, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS 528, 531 (William M. Malloy ed., 
1910); see also TucKER, supra note 157, § 19, at 20-21 (quoting letter from John Hay in the 
Department of State noting that a treaty with Great Britain concerning treatment of foreign 
insurance companies would not be feasible because of domestic concerns relating to the inva­
sion of state prerogatives). 
177. See 5 JoHN BASSETT MooRE, A DIGEST OF lNTERNATIONAL LAw § 736, at 166 
(1906); TUCKER, supra note 157, § 297, at 339; Mikell, supra note 157, at 557-58. 
178. See 1 BUTLER, supra note 158, at 6; CORWIN, supra note 153, at 296; WRIGHT, supra 
note 147, at 89. Charles Butler was the first scholar to directly challenge the view that the 
treaty power was limited by the reserved powers of the states. See G. Edward White, The 
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the states'-rights view,�however, embraced the other component of 
the nationalist view - that the treaty power also is unlimited by 
subject matter.179 And other constitutional scholars in this period 
expressed the view that the treaty power was in fact limited by sub­
ject matter.180 Moreover, U.S. officials continued to express the 
view that the United States could not regulate by treaty matters 
reserved to the states.181 
In sum, although the Supreme Court upheld a number of trea­
ties in the nineteenth century, it did not suggest that the treaty 
power was unlimited. Indeed, in many of these cases the Court ex­
pressly stated that the power was limited by subject matter, states' 
rights, or both. Such limitations also were reflected, as noted 
above, in the views of the treaty makers themselves. The states'­
rights issue became highly contested in the academic community in 
the early twentieth century, but even then many commentators ap­
peared to assume at least a subject matter limitation. 
III. REmcrroN OF TENTH AMENDMENT AND SUBJECT 
MATIER LIMITATIONS 
In this Part, I explain how each of the two components of the 
nationalist view of the treaty power became orthodoxy. I :first dis­
cuss the rejection of Tenth Amendment limitations on the scope of 
the treaty power, and I then discuss the rejection of any meaningful 
Transfonnation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. (forthcom­
ing Feb. 1999). 
179. See, e.g., CHARLES H. BURR, THE TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 
285 (1912) (noting that "treaties must only contain provisions which in the usual and normal 
intercourse of nations should properly become the subject of treaties" and that the treaty­
making power does not allow for "the accomplishment of an internal change in the govern­
ment of one sovereign party to a treaty"); CoRWIN, supra note 153, at 18 (stating that the 
treaty power "must be confined to its proper business"); NICHOLAS PENDLETON MITCHELL, 
STATE lN:rERESTS IN AMERICAN TREATIES 154 (1936) (concluding that reserved power limi­
tations "may be ignored, so long as the subject of negotiation is a proved national interest, 
and properly a matter for international treatment"); Wright, supra note 112, at 258 ("The 
immunity from treaty interference of certain State powers can only be sustained by showing 
that they cover a subject-matter inherently inappropriate for treaty negotiations. That there 
are matters within State legislative competence thus excluded from treaty making is doubt­
less true."); see also Arthur Littleton, Note, The Treaty Power and the Tenth Amendment, 68 
U. PA. L. REv. 160, 162 (1919) ("[E)ven those who would grant the widest limits to the 
treaty-making power do not on that account assert that the President and the Senate have a 
limitless field of subjects about which to negotiate with foreign countries."). 
180. See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 157, § 216 (noting that the subject matter of trea­
ties must be of "international concern"); cf. ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE TREATY PowER 
UNDER THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 143, at 141 (1908) (stating that "it 
cannot be said that the treaty-making power is unlimited," but also noting that "[w)hat the 
limits are, no one can correctly state"). 
181. See HAROLD w. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 61, 113 
(1931) (describing U.S. objections to labor conventions). 
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subject matter limitation on the treaty power. As I explain, these 
two components of the nationalist view have developed largely in 
isolation, and there has been little attempt to consider the implica­
tions for American federalism of combining them. 
A. Rejection of Tenth Amendment Limitations 
As discussed above, the existence of states'-rights limitations on 
the treaty power was assumed at various times during the nine­
teenth century.182 This assumption was reflected not only in 
Supreme Court decisions, but also in the statements and actions of 
the political branches.183 The states'-rights issue then became the 
subject of substantial academic debate during the early part of the 
twentieth century, with leading commentators on both sides.184 
The conventional wisdom is that the death knell to the states' -
rights view came in 1920, with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Missouri v. Holland.185 The Holland case, "perhaps the most fa­
mous and most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign 
affairs,"186 involved the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act of 1918.187 This Act implemented a 1916 treaty between 
the United States and Great Britain that was designed to protect 
birds migrating in the United States and Canada.188 Among other 
things, the Act made it unlawful to hunt or capture any migratory 
birds covered by the terms of the Convention. The State of Mis­
souri argued that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with states' 
rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Missouri pointed out 
that two district courts already had held a similar statute, which had 
been enacted before the treaty, to be beyond Congress's commerce 
powers.189 
182. See supra section II.B. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 173·76. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78. 
185. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). For an excellent discussion of this case, see LoFGREN, supra 
note 131, ch. 4. 
186. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 190. 
187. Migratory Bird 'I!eaty Act, Aug. 16, 1916, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (current ver­
sion at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994) (amending the Act to include treaties with Mexico, Japan, and 
the U.S.S.R.)). 
188. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 
39 Stat. 1702. Great Britain at that time handled Canada's foreign relations. See Jeffrey L. 
Friesen, Note, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations: 
Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1415, 1428 (1994). 
189. See Brief for Appellant at 42, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1919) (No. 609) 
(citing United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh, 
221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915)); see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (referring to these decisions). 
The co=erce power was perceived to be much narrower at the time of Holland than it is 
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In rejecting Missouri's argument, the Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Holmes, acknowledged that the Act might be outside the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.190 The Court stated, however, that 
any limits on the treaty power "must be ascertained in a different 
way" from limits on domestic powers.191 The Court pointed out 
that the treaty in question did not "contravene any prohibitory 
words to be found in the Constitution" but rather was alleged to 
violate "some invisible radiation from the general terms of the 
Tenth Amendment."192 To show a violation of states' rights here, 
the Court said, "it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment 
. . . because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is dele­
gated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the author­
ity of the United States . . . are declared the supreme law of the 
land."193 In concluding that there was no violation of states' rights, 
the Court observed that the treaty concerned "a national interest of 
very nearly the first magnitude" that could be protected "only by 
national action in concert with that of another power."194 
There was some concern after this decision that the treaty 
power might not be subject to any constitutional restraints, includ­
ing the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights.19S This 
concern was due in part to an observation by the Court, based on its 
reading of the Supremacy Clause, that "[a]cts of Congress are the 
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Con­
stitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the 
authority of the United States."196 As one commentator noted af­
ter the decision, the Court's "hint that there may be no other test to 
be applied than whether the treaty has been duly concluded indi-
today. Cf. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1480·82 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
Eagle Protection Act as a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power). 
190. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432-33. 
191. See 252 U.S. at 433. 
192. 252 U.S. at 433-34. 
193. 252 U.S. at 432. 
194. 252 U.S. at 435. Here, the Court was echoing the U.S. government's argument that 
the regulation in question "can be accomplished only by concert of action on the part of two 
or more States or countries." 252 U.S. at 428. Justices Van Devanter and Pitney dissented 
without opinion. See 252 U.S. at 435. 
195. Decisions before Holland had indicated, however, that the treaty power was subject 
to constitutional restraints. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 {1890) {"It would 
not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution 
forbids . . . .  "); The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 {1870) ("It need 
hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in viola­
tion of that instrument."); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (noting that 
courts are not to disregard the terms of treaties "unless they violate the Constitution of the 
United States"). 
196. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
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cates that the court might hold that specific constitutional limita­
tions in favor of individual liberty and property are not applicable 
to deprivations wrought by treaties."197 
This concern was partially alleviated by the Supreme Court in a 
1957 decision, Reid v. Covert.198 In the consolidated cases at is­
sue, 199 military courts had convicted two wives of U.S. servicemen 
of murdering their husbands on foreign bases. Executive agree­
ments between the United States and the host countries permitted 
U.S. military courts to exercise jurisdiction over the offenses. Nev­
ertheless, the wives argued that their trials were unconstitutional 
because they were conducted without a grand jury indictment and a 
trial by jury. The Court agreed, with a plurality of the Court stating 
that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the 
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free 
from the restraints of the Constitution. "200 The plurality distin­
guished Holland, noting that the treaty in Holland "was not incon­
sistent with any specific provision of the Constitution."201 There 
had been no Tenth Amendment problem in Holland, explained the 
plurality, because "[t]o the extent that the United States can validly 
make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power 
to the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no 
barrier. "202 
In distinguishing Holland, the plurality in Reid may have broad­
ened it. The plurality read Holland as standing for the proposition 
that a valid treaty is not subject to any Tenth Amendment limita­
tions. It was possible to read Holland, however, as holding simply 
that there are some actions that the federal government can take 
pursuant to the treaty power that it cannot take pursuant to the 
197. Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REv. 1, 13 (1920); 
see also, e.g., Forrest Revere Black, Missouri v. Holland - A Judicial Milestone on the Road 
to Absolutism, 25 ILL. L. REv. 911, 914-16 (1931) (making the same point). 
198. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
199. The Court's decision addressed two consolidated cases, which were before the Court 
on rehearing. For the Court's original decisions in these cases, see Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 
U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). In those decisions, the Court did 
not reach the issue of the scope of the treaty power. 
200. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16. The Court explained that the reason the treaties referred to in 
Article VI "were not limited to those made in 'pursuance' of the Constitution was so that 
agreements made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation . . .  would remain 
in effect." 354 U.S. at 16-17. Early historical materials appear to confirm this reading. See 
Notes of James Madison (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 109, at 417; see also LoFGREN, supra note 131, at 148-55; RAWLE, supra note 152, 
at 60. 
201. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. 
202. 354 U.S. at 18 (citing for that proposition United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-
25 (1941), and the authorities collected there). 
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commerce power. In other words, the treaty power, far from con­
ferring on the federal government unlimited power vis-a-vis the 
states, confers a different (and in some cases broader) power than 
that conferred pursuant to the Commerce Clause.203 The Court in 
Holland did, after all, note that "[w]e do not mean to imply that 
there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power,"204 and it 
also emphasized the national interest at stake in the treaty in ques­
tion. 20s Moreover, the Court stated that "[w]e must consider what 
this country has become in deciding what [the Tenth] Amendment 
has reserved,"206 perhaps suggesting that the Tenth Amendment's 
restrictions had changed over time but were not irrelevant.207 Nev­
ertheless, the construction of Holland by the Reid plurality is the 
one that has generally been accepted by lower courts208 and com­
mentators,209 and the Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue. 
During the 1950s, there was a vigorous effort, led by Senator 
Bricker of Ohio and Frank Holman of the American Bar Associa­
tion, to overturn Holland by means of a constitutional amend­
ment. 210 There were numerous versions of the "Bricker 
203. For one commentator who read Holland in this narrower way, see C.M. Micou, 
Comment, The Treaty Making Power and the Constitution, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 91, 95 (1921). 
204. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
205. See 252 U.S. at 435; see also LoFGREN, supra note 131, at 138-40 (discussing the 
Court's "national interest test"). · 
206. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
207. See LoFGREN, supra note 131, at 142; Jay Lloyd Jackson, The Tenth Amendment 
Versus the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United States (pt. 2), 14 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 441, 444 (1928). 
208. See, e.g., United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1998); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. 
of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 994 (D. Haw. 1979); Tokaji v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 67 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); People v. Jandreau, 185 N.W.2d 375, 
380 (Mich. 1971). 
209. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191; 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NOWAK, 
TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.5, at 509 (2d ed. 1992); TRIBE, supra note 43, at 227; 
Damrosch, supra note 14, at 530; Posner & Spiro, supra note 75, at 1213 n.24. But see Con· 
kle, supra note 57, at 664 (observing that "the Court [in Holland] did not reject the federal· 
ism argument out of hand" but rather "balanced the competing interests that were at stake"); 
Marci A. Hamilton, Slouching Toward Globalization: Charting the Pitfalls in the Drive to 
Internationalize Religious Human Rights, 46 EMORY LJ. 307, 317 (1997) (book review) (not· 
ing that the Court in Holland "did not . . .  say that any time the President signs, and the 
Senate approves, a treaty the states' rights are automatically controverted"). Some of the 
nationalist commentators do hold out the possibility that there are a few dramatic things that 
could not be done to the states by treaty, such as ceding a portion of a state's territory to a 
foreign nation without the state's consent or modifying the republican government of a state. 
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 193. 
210. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RlGlITS TREATIES AND THE 
SENATE (1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST 
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). Although the American Bar Association 
as an organization supported the amendment, its Section on International and Comparative 
Law opposed it. For the hearings on the proposed amendment, see Treaties and Execlllive 
Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judici· 
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Amendment," one of which provided that "[a] treaty shall become 
effective as internal law in the United States only through legisla­
tion which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."211 The pro­
posed amendment never received the approval of the Senate, 
although one version came close.212 During the time this amend­
ment was being considered, there was, once again, substantial aca­
demic discussion of the proper scope of the treaty power.213 
The Bricker Amendment controversy died out for several rea­
sons. First, the Reid decision, discussed above, addressed the con­
cern expressed by some proponents of the amendment that the 
treaty power might not be subject even to the individual rights pro­
tections of the Constitution.214 Second, during this period, the 
Supreme Court was increasingly recognizing expansive domestic 
federal power, including the power to regulate extensively in the 
human rights area.215 Third, the treaty makers indicated that they 
would exercise substantial self-restraint with respect to overriding 
state prerogatives. Thus, for example, the Senate attached a reser­
vation in 1951 to the U.S. ratification of the Charter of the Organi­
zation of American States stating that 
none of its provisions shall be considered as enlarging the powers of 
the Federal Government of the United States or limiting the powers 
of the several states of the Federal Union with respect to any matters 
recognized under the Constitution as being within the reserved pow­
ers of the several states.216 
A similar example is the Senate's statement in connection with its 
consent in 1961 to the Convention on the Organization for Eco­
nomic Cooperation and Development that "nothing in the conven-
ary, 84th Cong. (1955); Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. 
Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. (1953); Treaties 
and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 130 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. (1952). 
211. S. REP. No. 83-412, at 1 (1953). For the various major versions, see KAUFMAN, supra 
note 210, at 201-03. 
212. See 100 CONG. REc. 2374-75 (1954) (recording a vote of 60-31, one vote short of the 
two-thirds requirement); see also TANANBAUM, supra note 210, at 180-81. 
213. See, e.g., George A. Fmch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the 
United States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 AM. J. INrL. L. 57 (1954); Arthur E. Suther­
land, Jr., Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HAR.v. L. REv. 1305 (1952); Whitton & Fowler, 
supra note 158, at 23. 
214. See TANANBAUM, supra note 210, at 213 (noting that the Court's decision in Reid 
"undermined the case for the Bricker amendment"). 
215. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
216. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2484, 
119 U.N.T.S. 3 (U.S. ratified Dec. 27, 1951). 
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tion . . .  confers any power on the Congress to take action in fields 
previously beyond the authority of Congress."211 
The approach of the federal government to human rights trea­
ties has been even more restrictive. The Eisenhower administra­
tion, through Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, announced in 
1953 that it had no intention of becoming a party to the then­
proposed human rights treaties.218 And for many years thereafter, 
the Senate refused to consent to any of the major human rights 
treaties submitted to it.219 The Senate recently has begun to ratify 
some of these treaties, but only subject to a now-standard set of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that limit 
the treaties' effect on domestic law. Among other things, these 
RUDs typically include a declaration that the treaty is non-self-exe­
cuting, as well as a statement that the United States understands 
that the treaty shall be implemented by the federal government 
only to the extent that it possesses legislative and judicial power 
over the matters in question, and otherwise by the state and lo­
cal governments.220 These RUDs reflect "a desire not to effec-
217. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 
14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1751-52, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 (U.S. ratified Mar. 23, 1961). 
218. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953). 
219. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 477 n.101. 
220. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Con· 
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CoNG. REc. S7634 
(daily ed. June 24, 1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. REc. 8070 (Apr. 2, 
1992); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 
CONG. REc. S17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Thus, as Professor Henkin explains: 
Senator Bricker lost the constitutional battle but perhaps not his political war. In large 
part because of "Brickerite" opposition, the United States long refused to adhere to 
human rights covenants and conventions. When, finally, the United States adhered to 
several of them, it did so subject to major reservations, understandings and declarations 
HENKIN, supra note 4, at 193 n.**. Although the United States has not yet ratified the Con­
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, federalism and 
non-self-execution conditions have been proposed in connection with that treaty as well. See 
STAFF OF SENAlE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1030 CONG., REPORT ON TIIE CONVEN· 
TION ON TIIE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 10-11 
(Co=. Print 1994). In consenting to the Genocide Convention, the Senate did not attach a 
non-self-execution condition, but it did declare that the President was not to deposit the 
instrument of ratification until implementing legislation was enacted. See U.S. Senate Reso­
lution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun­
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 CoNG. REc. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). 
Furthermore, the implementing legislation eventually enacted by Congress neither preempts 
state law nor creates any rights against the states or the federal government. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1092 (1994). 
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tuate changes to domestic law by means of the treaty-making 
power."221 
A final reason that the federalism controversy died out was that 
many officials and commentators assumed that there was at le!'lst a 
subject matter limitation on the treaty power, which reduced con­
cerns about its use to regulate internal matters.222 As discussed be­
low, this limitation too has now been rejected, at least in the 
academic community. 
B. Rejection of Subject Matter Limitation 
The second component of the nationalist view of the treaty 
power - that there is no meaningful subject matter limitation on 
that power - has become well accepted only recently. As dis­
cussed above, a subject matter limitation appears to have been as­
sumed both during the Founding and at times during the nineteenth 
century.223 The Court in Holland also may have assumed the exist­
ence of a subject matter limitation.224 Other decisions ·from the 
early twentieth century further reflected a subject matter limitation 
(albeit a broad one ),225 as did some of the academic commentary.226 
The existence of a subject matter limitation on the treaty power 
was subsequently suggested in 1929 by Charles Evans Hughes.227 
In a speech to the American Society of International Law,228 
Hughes stated that the treaty power might be limited to matters of 
"international concern" and thus not allow for the regulation of 
matters "which normally and appropriately were within the local 
221. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL 
L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1993) (referring to the RUDs attached to the Senate's ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-41. 
223. See supra Part II. 
224. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
225. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (stating that the treaty power 
is "broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations"); 
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (noting that the treaty power "extend[s] 
to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations"). 
226. See supra notes 179-80. 
227. Hughes was a former Secretary of State, at the time a Judge on the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the President of the American Society of International Law, and 
soon to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
228. Although Hughes's remarks were made extemporaneously, they presumably repre­
sented his fully-considered views on the subject See WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., lNTERNA­
TIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 99 n.12 (3d ed. 1971). Professor Henkin has stated, 
incorrectly in my view, that the idea of a subject matter limitation originated with Hughes. 
See Louis Henkin, "International Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63 AM. 
J. hm.. L. 272, 274 (1969). 
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jurisdiction of the States."229 These remarks did not provoke sub­
stantial controversy at the time. Rather, as Professor Henkin notes, 
Hughes's remarks were "accepted as authority."230 
Indeed, opponents of the Bricker Amendment during the 1950s 
invoked the subject matter limitation in support of their argument 
that the Amendment was unnecessary. Thus, for example, an 
American Bar Association committee that opposed the Amend­
ment argued that it was unnecessary in part because of "the very 
fundamental limitation upon the extent to which a treaty can affect 
internal law in that it must concern a matter which is 'properly the 
subject of negotiation with a foreign country.'"231 Similarly, Secre­
tary of State Dulles stated during the Bricker hearings that a treaty 
could not regulate matters "which do not essentially affect the ac­
tions of nations in relation to international affairs, but are purely 
internal.''232 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit came close to 
formally endorsing the Hughes view in 1957. In Power Authority of 
New York v. Federal Power Commission,233 the court considered the 
effect of a reservation attached by the Senate to its ratification of a 
treaty with Canada concerning use of the waters of the Niagara 
River. The reservation stated, among other things, that "no project 
for redevelopment of the United States share of such waters shall 
be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of Con­
gress.''234 The court observed that enforcement of this reservation 
would raise a "constitutional concern"235 because the reservation 
"relate[ d] to a matter of purely domestic concern.''236 The court 
avoided ruling on the constitutional question237 by construing the 
reservation as merely "an expression of the Senate's desires and not 
229. 1929 AM. SoCY. hm.. L. PRoc. 194, 194-96. 
230. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 471 n.87. 
231. ABA CoMM. oN CoNST. AsPEcrs oF hm.. AGREEMENTS, REPORT To SECTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CoMPARATIVE LAW ON SENATE JOINT REsoLUTION 1 AND THE 
KNoWLAND SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT 19 {1953) (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 
267 (1890) ); see also id. at 6 ("The scope of both treaties and executive agreements is subject, 
besides, to the overall limitation that they must treat subjects of proper international 
concern."). 
232. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 183 (1955). 
233. 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). 
234. 247 F.2d at 539 (quoting Treaty Between the United States and Canada Concerning 
Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 694, 699). 
235. 247 F.2d at 543 (quoting United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957)). 
236. 247 F.2d at 543. 
237. See 247 F.2d at 543. 
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a part of the treaty."238 The court distinguished Holland as involv­
ing a treaty "related to a 'national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude' which 'can be protected only by national action in con­
cert with that of another power."'239 
Although the position of the State Department on this issue va­
ried to some extent during this period, it too appeared to agree that 
there was a subject matter limitation, at least as a matter of policy. 
Thus, for example, it stated in 1955 that "[t]reaties are not to be 
used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social changes 
or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures established in 
relation to what are essentially matters of domestic concern. "240 A 
number of commentators in this period also assumed that there was 
a subject matter limitation on the treaty power.241 
The notion of a subject matter restriction on the treaty power 
perhaps reached its highest level of acceptance in 1965, when the 
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States expressly endorsed it. In its black-letter-law provisions, the 
Restatement (Second) provided that the treaty power is limited to 
matters "of international concern."242 The Restatement (Second) 
further stated, in its comments, that international agreements "must 
relate to the external concerns of the nation as distinguished from 
matters of a purely internal nature."243 In support of this limita­
tion, the Restatement (Second) noted, among other things, that 
"[n]o power granted to the United States by the Constitution is un­
limited."244 It also linked the purported subject matter limitation 
with the lack of a Tenth Amendment limitation on the treaty power, 
238. 247 F.2d at 542. 
239. 247 F.2d at 542 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920)). Even the 
dissenting judge, in arguing for the validity of the reservation, acknowledged that "[i]t may 
well be that, no matter how broad the power to make treaties, it is not without limits . . . .  " 
247 F.2d at 552 (Bastian, J., dissenting). For arguments in support of the validity of the 
reservation, see Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reser­
vation, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 1151 (1956). 
240. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CIRCULAR No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INTL. L. 
784, 785 (1956). By contrast, the State Department caused some alarm with its quite differ­
ent {although perhaps prescient) statement in 1950 that "[t]here is no longer any real distinc­
tion between 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs." OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE, PuB. No. 3972, OuR FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1950) (General Foreign Policy Series 26, 
1950). 
241. See, e.g., C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 
MINN. L. REv. 709, 764 (1958); Randall H. Nelson, The Subject-Matter Limitation on the 
Treaty-Making Power, 11 J. PUB. L. 122, 155 (1962). 
242. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 117(1)(a) (1965) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT (SECOND)]. 
243. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 242, § 117 cmt. b. 
244. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 242, § 117 cmt. d. 
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noting that a treaty is constitutional, notwithstanding the reserved 
powers of the states, so long as "it deals with matters of interna­
tional concern and is not in conflict with any express limitations on 
the powers of the government."245 The existence of a subject mat­
ter limitation on the treaty power was further supported in 1967 by 
the American Bar Association.246 
After the publication of the Restatement (Second), however, 
such a limitation also became the subject of academic criticism, 
most notably from Professor Henkin. Henkin criticized this idea in 
an article-in th� late 1960s,247 as well as in his famous 1972 book on 
foreign affairs law.248 Henkin argued that "every treaty, regardless 
of subject, serves the external purposes of the United States," and 
he questioned how one could in any event distinguish "external" 
from "internal" matters.249 
The idea of a subject matter limitation was then expressly re­
jected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which 
was first published in draft form in 1980 and subsequently published 
in final form· in 1987. The Restatement (Third), for which Professor 
Henkin was the Chief Reporter, declares that, "[c]ontrary to what 
was once suggested, the Constitution does not require that an inter­
national agreement deal only with 'matters of international con­
cern.' "25° The Restatement (Third) does not cite any intervening 
authority for this proposition,251 and, indeed, the one decision on 
point between the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement 
(Third) - the Power Authority decision - had come out essen­
tially the other way.252 
In what has become a rather disturbing phenomenon in the de­
velopment of American foreign affairs law, the new Restatement 
(Third) position, adopted without authority, is now being treated as 
245. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 242, § 118 cmt. a. 
246. See American Bar Association, Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law 
Through United Nations: Human Rights Conventions and Recommendations, 1 INTI.. LAW. 
600 (1967). 
247. See Henkin, supra note 228. 
248. See Loms HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 154 (1972). 
249. Henkin, supra note 228, at 276-77. 
250. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. c. 
251. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. c; see also Louis Henkin, 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), 74 AM. J. INTL. L. 
954, 957 (1980) (explaining the proposed change). 
252. Professor Henkin briefly mentioned this change during the 1982 proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law, but there apparently was no public debate or discus­
sion regarding the change. See Panel Discussion, The Draft Restatement of the Foreign Rela­
tions Law of the United States (Revised), 76 AM. Soc. INTI.. L. PROC. 184, 188-89 (1984). 
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if it were black-letter law. In his recent revision pf his foreign af­
fairs book, for example, Professor Henkin cites the Restatement 
(Third) for the proposition that the subject matter limitation has 
"now been authoritatively abandoned."253 Unfortunately, this is 
not the only instance in which the Restatement (Third) has been 
used in this self-fulfilling manner.254 In any event, the Restatement 
(Third) 's rejection of a subject matter limitation on the treaty 
power now appears to be the accepted view, at least among aca­
demic commentators.255 Importantly, no one �eems to have consid­
ered the implications of combining the lack of Tenth Amendment 
limitations with the lack of a subject matter limitation. 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE NATIONALIST VIEW 
As we have seen, there are two components to the nationalist 
view of the treaty power - the lack of Tenth Amendment limita­
tions, and the lack of any meaningful subject matter limitation. 
When combined, these components give the treaty-makers essen­
tially unlimited power vis-a-vis the states. In our federalist system, 
which is premised on the principle of limited and enumerated pow­
ers, this result requires justification. In this Part, I examine the 
three principal justifications for the nationalist view and I find that, 
especially in light of recent developments, none of them is 
convincing. 
253. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 474 n.89. 
254. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 834-37 (documenting how the Restate­
ment (Third)'s position on the domestic status of customary international law lacked author­
ity and yet was presented and accepted as settled law); David B. Massey, Note, How the 
American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INTI.. L. 419 (1997) (describing how the 
Restatement (Third)'s position on the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction lacked authority and 
yet was presented and accepted as settled law). But see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Non­
sense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 371, 377-80 (1997) (disputing the charge that the Restatement (Third) 
lacked authority for its claims regarding the domestic legal status of customary international 
law). 
255. See, e.g., CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 38, at 166; Ackerman & Golove, supra 
note 37, at 843-44; Damrosch, supra note 14, at 530; Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty is a Treaty 
is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INTI.. L. 51, 57 n.29 (1992). Professor Tribe may be one of the few 
dissenters, in that he has stated that the treaty power "is legitimate only for international 
agreements fairly related to foreign relations." Tribe, supra note 39, at 1261 n.133. Even he 
notes, however, that "[w]ith global interdependence reaching across an ever broadening 
spectrum of issues," a subject matter restriction "seems unlikely to prove a serious limita­
tion." TRIBE, supra note 43, at 228. 
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A. Delegation Argument 
The purported immunity of the treaty power from federalism 
limitations is often premised on what I will call the delegation argu­
ment. This argument is that, because the treaty power has been del­
egated to the federal government, exercises of that power do not 
implicate the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the 
states. As Professor Henkin states, "[s]ince the Treaty Power was 
delegated to the federal government, whatever is within its scope is 
not reserved to the states: the Tenth Amendment is not mate­
rial."256 This reasoning is reflected in both Holland and Reid. The 
Court in Holland stated that "it is not enough to refer to the Tenth 
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United 
States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is dele­
gated expressly."257 Similarly, the plurality in Reid noted that, "[t]o 
the extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the peo­
ple and the States have delegated their power to the National Gov­
ernment and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier."258 
The delegation argument has superficial appeal. The treaty 
power, after all, is expressly delegated to the national government, 
and the federal government's ratification of treaties therefore 
would seem to fall within the principle of limited and enumerated 
powers. Moreover, the language of the Tenth Amendment only 
purports to reserve to the states "[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution."259 Relying on these and other 
points, Professor Henkin goes so far as to describe the delegation 
argument as "clear and indisputable. "260 
The fundamental fl.aw with the delegation argument, however, is 
that it fails to provide any reason for giving special Tenth Amend­
ment immunity to the treaty power. Although it is true that the 
treaty power has been delegated to the federal government, this is 
true of all federal powers. The power to regulate interstate com­
merce, for example, also has been delegated to the federal govern­
ment, but this, by itself, has not made it immune from Tenth 
Amendment scrutiny. And, indeed, notwithstanding this delega­
tion, the Supreme Court has held in a number of cases, including 
256. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191; see also, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 153, at 5-6; Chandler 
P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty Power Under the Constitlltion, 1 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 636, 657 (1907) (making this argument). 
257. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
258. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957). 
259. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
260. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191. 
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cases decided near the time of Holland, that the Tenth Amendment 
operates as a substantive restraint.261 In sum, the fact of delegation 
says nothing about the scope of the delegation, and it certainly does 
not establish that the delegation is unlimited in scope.262 
Of course, the willingness of the Supreme Court to enforce the 
Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on any federal 
power has varied. Although the Court has at times treated the 
Tenth Amendment as an independent restraint on delegated pow­
ers,263 at other times it has described the Tenth Amendment as stat­
ing "but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surren(;lered."264 Under this analysis, states' rights are protected by 
policing the scope of the delegated powers, not by giving immunity 
to reserved state powers per se. The Court's current position on 
this issue is not entirely clear, although the Court appears to be 
treating the Tenth Amendment as an independent restraint.265 In 
any event, the key point here is that whatever limitations the Tenth 
Amendment does impose, it is not evident from the delegation ar­
gument why these limitations should not apply to the treaty power. 
Some proponents of this aspect of the nationalist view have 
pointed out that, unlike its treatment of certain other delegated 
powers, the Constitution expressly denies states the power to enter 
261. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274-76 (1918) (invalidating statute 
designed to prevent interstate shipments of products made by child labor); Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 (1907) (holding that Congress did not have the power to regu­
late state use of a river for the purpose of reclamation of arid lands). It would seem unlikely 
that the 7-2 majority in Holland thought it was implicitly overruling those earlier decisions. 
It is possible, however, that the author of the Holland decision, Justice Holmes, did intend 
such a holding, given his dissent in Hammer. See 247 U.S. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
262. See Mikell, supra note 157, at 539-40. 
263. In addition to the decisions cited supra note 261, see, for example, National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), where the Court justified its invalidation of fed­
eral statutory provisions "not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative 
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the 
authority in that manner." 
264. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
265. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992), the Court purported to 
treat the Tenth Amendment not as a restraint on delegated powers per se, but rather as a 
reminder that states' rights must be considered in determining the scope of delegated powers. 
At the same time, however, the Court appeared to acknowledge that its approach was func­
tionally the same as applying the Tenth Amendment as an independent restraint on dele­
gated powers. See 505 U.S. at 159. In a more recent decision, the Court used language 
suggesting that it viewed the Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on delegated 
powers. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2379, 2383 (1997) (stating that the provi­
sions in question "violate[ ]  the principle of state sovereignty," are "not in accord with the 
Constitution," and "run afoul" of the rule that the federal government cannot commandeer 
state governments). The concurrence in that case by Justice O'Connor, the author of the 
earlier New York opinion, is even more explicit on this point. See 117 S. Ct. at 2385 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment . . . .  "). 
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into treaties.266 They Flfgue that, even if some delegated powers are 
subject to Tenth Amendment limitations, this should not be the 
case for delegated powers that, like the treaty power, are held ex­
clusively by the federal government. This argument, however, is a 
non sequitur. While it is true that the states have not reserved the 
power to enter into treaties, this does not mean that they have not 
reserved other regulatory powers that might be infringed by certain 
exercises of the federal treaty power. In other words, the Constitu­
tion's denial of state power to enter into treaties "proves that the 
federal power to make treaties is exclusive, but it does not prove 
that it is unlimited, or that [it] is not limited by the tenth amend­
ment."267 The exclusivity argument breaks down even further when 
it is remembered that the Constitution allows the states some ability 
to enter into international agreements,268 and that many interna­
tional agreements made by the federal government today take the 
form of executive agreements rather than Article II treaties.269 
266. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 189; Elihu Root, The Real Questions Under the 
Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 AM. J. INTL. L. 273, 278 
(1907); Wright, supra note 112, at 257. 
267. Mikell, supra note 157, at 539-40; see also, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 
274 (1918) ("The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy 
the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment 
to the Constitution."). 
268. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (allowing states to enter into "Agreement[s] or 
Compact[s]" with foreign nations with congressional consent); see generally Raymond S. 
Rodgers, The Capacity of States of the Union to Conclude International Agreements: The 
Background and Some Recent Developments, 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 1021 (1967). Some agree­
ments between states and foreign nations may not even require congressional consent. The 
Supreme Court has held that states may enter into interstate agreements without congres­
sional consent as long as the agreements do not "tend[ ] to the increase of political power in 
the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). Some state courts have applied this 
standard to agreements with foreign nations. See, e.g., In re Manuel P., 263 Cal. Rptr. 447, 
459 (1989) (upholding agreement between San Diego and Mexico to share information con­
cerning juvenile offenders); McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544-47 (N.D. 1917) 
(upholding county's construction of a drainage ditch in cooperation with a Canadian town); 
see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. f (noting that "agreements involv­
ing local transborder issues, such as agreements to curb a source of pollution, to coordinate 
police or sewage services, or to share an energy source, have been considered not to require 
Congressional consent"). 
269. On its face, this exclusivity argument might appear to be supported by the Supreme 
Court's approach to Congress's spending power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving 
Congress the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). The 
Court has suggested that the Spending Clause, unlike other Article I powers such as the 
power to regulate interstate commerce, may not be subject to Tenth Amendment restraints. 
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 
(1935). The Court has based this suggestion, however, not on the ground that the spending 
power is exclusive, but rather on the ground that federal spending decisions are not them­
selves preemptive federal law. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210; see also Merritt, supra note 22, at 
1577. The treaty power, by contrast, does allow for the creation of supreme federal law. See 
U.S. CoNST. art. VI. It is also worth noting that the Court has said that even the spending 
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The problematic nature of the delegation argument becomes 
further evident when its logic is applied in the context of separation 
of powers rather than federalism.270 One could argue that, like fed­
eralism restrictions, separation of powers restrictions do not apply 
to powers delegated exclusively to a branch of the federal govern­
ment. This argument was accepted to some extent by the Supreme 
Court in a much-criticized decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.271 In that case, Congress by Joint Resolution pur­
ported to confer on the President the authority to implement a 
criminal prohibition on the sale of arms in the United States to 
countries engaged in a conflict in Latin America. In response to the 
argument that this constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative 
authority to the President, a plausible argument at that time in light 
of the Court's precedent,272 the Court sharply distinguished be­
tween federal power over external affairs and federal power over 
internal affairs. 
In particular, the Court observed that "[t]he broad statement 
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied pow­
ers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated 
powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal af­
fairs. "273 The Court explained that, whereas the states had dele­
gated certain limited powers over internal affairs to the federal 
government, this was not the case with respect to powers relating to 
external affairs: "Since the states severally never possessed interna-
power "is of course not unlimited," and that the Court has articulated several restrictions on 
the scope of that power, including two relating to subject matter. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-
08. For an argument that the Court should impose more restrictions on the spending power 
given the Court's renewed commitment to federalism, see Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Fed­
eral Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911 (1995); see also Thomas R. McCoy & 
Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REv. 85 
(criticizing Dole). 
270. Of course, federalism and separation of powers are not unrelated issues. If the 
treaty power gives the federal government additional power vis-a-vis the states, it also gives 
the treaty makers additional power vis-a-vis the other branches of the federal government. 
See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1680-81 (discussing linkage between federalism and separa­
tion of powers). 
271. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
272. See AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421-30 (1934). 
273. Curtiss-Wright, 199 U.S. at 315-16. This distinction between constitutional limita­
tions with respect to external affairs and those with respect to internal affairs was one that the 
author of the Curtiss-Wright decision, Justice Sutherland, had made in earlier writings before 
coming to the Court. See GEORGE SunmRLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WoRLD 
AFFAIRS 24-47 (1919); GEORGE SunmRLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF 
THE NATIONAL GoVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 61-417 (1909), reprinted in 191 N. AM. REv. 373 
(1910). 
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tional powers, such powers could not have been carved from the 
mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United 
States from some other source. "274 One such power is the "very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international rela­
tions."275 The existence of this power, reasoned the Court, meant 
that the usual separation of powers limitations on delegations of 
authority to the executive branch do not apply with respect to for­
eign affairs matters.276 
The reasoning in Curtiss-Wright is to some extent the separation 
of powers analogue to Holland. Just as the federalism restrictions 
operated differently with respect to external matters in Holland, so 
did the separation of powers restrictions in Curtiss-Wright. More­
over, in both decisions, the Court distinguished between internal 
matters, over which the states retained some sovereign authority, 
and external matters, over which the states did not. In assessing the 
validity of the delegation argument, it is therefore important to 
note that the reasoning of Curtiss-Wright has received "withering 
criticism" from commentators.277 Among other things, commenta­
tors have criticized the reasoning for "carv[ing] a broad exception 
to the historic conception, often reiterated, never questioned, and 
explicitly reaffirmed in the Tenth Amendment, that the federal gov­
ernment is one of enumerated powers only."278 
Moreover, the Supreme Court arguably has repudiated the logic 
of Curtiss-Wright. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,219 
the Court found a presidential order authorizing a seizure of the 
nation's steel mills to be invalid, notwithstanding the President's 
claim that the seizure was necessary for national defense given the 
ongoing conflict in Korea. The Court stated that "[t]he President's 
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself."280 In his famous concur­
rence in that case, Justice Jackson observed that much of the 
274. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316. 
275. 299 U.S. at 320. 
276. See 299 U.S. at 320-22. 
277. See HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990). 
For examples of this criticism, see FRANCK, supra note 2, at 14-18; Michael J. Glennon, 1lvo 
Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. 
INTI.. L. 5 (1988); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice 
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss­
Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973). 
278. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 20. 
279. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
280. 343 U.S. at 585. 
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Court's opinion in Curtiss-Wright had been "dictum,"281 and he re­
iterated the traditional view that "the executive branch, like the 
Federal Government as a whole, possesses only delegated pow­
ers. "282 In its subsequent decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan,283 a 
case involving a challenge to an executive agreement, the Court 
largely endorsed the Youngstown approach rather than the Curtiss­
Wright approach.284 
Given the criticism and erosion of the separation of powers rea­
soning in Curtiss-Wright, it is perhaps not surprising that propo­
nents of the nationalist view do not argue that the treaty power is 
immune from implied limitations arising from separation of powers. 
Professor Henkin, for example, states that "[t]he Treaty Power . . .  
is not limited by the powers of Congress, but it is assumed to be 
subject to other radiations from the separation of powers."285 In­
deed, notwithstanding Curtiss-Wright, Henkin notes specifically 
that "[i]t has been assumed that constitutional limitations on dele­
gation of legislative power apply as well to delegation by treaty."286 
These proponents fail to explain, however, why the implied limita­
tions of separation of powers should govern when the implied limi­
tations of federalism do not.287 The delegation argument does not 
provide such an explanation. 
281. 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
282. 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
283. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
284. See 453 U.S. at 668-69; see also Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: 
Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1244-45 (1987) (discuss­
ing how Youngstown and Dames & Moore cut back on the broad reasoning of Curtiss­
Wright). 
285. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 195 (citations omitted). 
286. Id. at 470 n.83. 
287. Cf. T UCKER, supra note 157, at 412 ("If the treaty power may not invade the powers 
of Congress, or the Judiciary, or the President, would not the same prohibition apply to any 
other branch of the Federal Government as well as to those? Surely there is no peculiar 
sanctity that doth hedge Congress, the Judiciary, or the President, which should be denied to 
the States - as integral parts of the Federal Government."). This separation of powers issue, 
like the federalism issue, is becoming increasingly important. Consider, for example, the 
constitutional challenges recently made against the binational panel review process estab­
lished in connection with the NAFTA trade agreement. It has been argued that this process, 
by delegating U.S. judicial authority to an international body, violates both the Appoint­
ments Clause and Article III. See American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 
F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of these constitutional claims on standing and 
jurisdictional grounds); see also Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitu­
tionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1455 (1992) (arguing that the binational review process under the 
predecessor treaty to NAFTA was unconstitutional); cf. CoRWIN, supra note 153, at 14 
(describing how President Taft objected to a 1907 treaty establishing an international prize 
court on the ground that the Constitution does not allow transfer of federal judicial power to 
a non-U.S. court). Another example is the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was re­
cently ratified by the United States. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
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B. Political Process Argument 
In addition to making the delegation argument, proponents of 
the nationalist view typically advance the political process argu­
ment. 1bis argument is that the political process provides sufficient 
protection of federalism, such that no substantive federalism re­
striction is necessary. Proponents of this view observe, for example, 
that two-thirds of the Senate must consent to treaties, and that the 
states have equal representation in the Senate.288 Although some 
proponents of this view correctly point out that the Founders placed 
significant emphasis on the process for concluding treaties as a pro­
tection for the states,289 they do not appear to claim that the 
Founders intended for this process protection to be exclusive, and 
any such claim likely would be unpersuasive given the Founding 
materials discussed above. Instead, they appear to make more of a 
stare decisis argument: there is no need to overturn the settled de­
cision in Holland because states' rights are not in fact threatened by 
the treaty power. 
1bis sort of argument is not, of course, unique to the treaty con­
text. A similar political process argument was made by commenta­
tors, and eventually accepted by the Supreme Court, with respect to 
federal legislative power in general. The theory was first advanced 
in the 1950s by Herbert Wechsler,29° and then later more thor­
oughly developed by Jesse Choper.291 Citing these writings, a 5-4 
majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the political process the­
ory in its 1985 Garcia decision.292 The Court concluded that "the 
fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on 
the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of pro-
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 
1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21 (1993). One scholar has made the plausible argument that 
the federal government's delegation through the Convention of weapons inspection authority 
to an international body violates the Appointments Clause. See John C. Yoo, The New Sov­
ereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments 
Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 87 (1998). 
288. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 443-44 n.4; see also CORWIN, supra note 153, at 
302-04; HENKIN, supra note 4, at 168, 189 n.**. 
289. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 153, at 65-74; see also supra text accompanying notes 
108-09, 118-122. 
290. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). 
291. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvraw AND TIIB NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS 
(1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of the National Power Vis-a-Vis The States: The Dispensa· 
bility of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). 
292. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.11 (1985). The 
Court also cited D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergov­
ernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982). 
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cess rather than one of result," and the Court said that "[a]ny sub­
stantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must 
find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, 
and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the 
national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of 
state autonomy.' "293 
Despite the Court's general endorsement of this theory in 
Garcia, there are several problems with relying on this argument 
today to support the nationalist view of the treaty power. First, the 
Supreme Court appears to have backed away from Garcia in recent 
years. Starting with its "clear statement" requirement in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 294 through its latest "commandeering" decision, Printz v. 
United States,295 the Court has steadily chipped away at the proposi­
tion that federalism protections are to be left solely to the political 
process. As Professor John Yoo recently explained, "[i]n these 
cases, the Court has articulated its intention to establish areas of 
state control that are to remain immune from federal regulation, 
and it has suggested that these areas can be identified by policing 
Congress' use of its enumerated powers."296 The political process 
theory also has been the subject of substantial academic criticism in 
recent years.297 A number of these critics have examined the 
mechanics of our political process and have concluded that "[t]he 
structural protections identified by Wechsler, Choper, and company 
are marginal at best. "298 Professor Steven Calabresi has pointed 
out, for example, that the campaign finance system, with its na­
tional special interest groups and PACs, undercuts the representa-
293. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)); see 
also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) ("Garcia holds that the [federalism] 
limits are structural, not substantive - i.e., that States must find their protection from con­
gressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined 
spheres of unregulable state activity."). 
294. 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991). 
295. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
296. Yoo, supra note 46, at 1312. 
297. The most prominent critical works include Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of 
Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 
752 (1995); McConnell, supra note 22, at 1485; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause 
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); John C. 
Pittenger, Garcia and the Political Safeguards of Fe,deralism: Is There a Better Solution to the 
Conundrum of the Tenth Amendment?, PUBLIUs, Wmter 1992, at 1; Andrzej Rapaczynski, 
From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. 
REv. 341; Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial 
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1987); and William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985). See also Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 362-63 (1997) (noting that "[n]umerous 
commentators have questioned the soundness of the Court's reasoning" in Garcia). 
298. Kramer, supra note 46, at 1520. 
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tion of state interests, and that the incentive structure for federal 
politicians favors the expansion of federal power rather than the 
protection of states' rights.299 
Second, the political process argument can draw little, if any, 
support from the original intent of the Founders. Although the 
Founders did intend for the process of making treaties - especially 
the two-thirds Senate advice and consent requirement - to protect 
states' rights,300 there is no evidence that they intended this to be 
the only protection.301 More importantly, several key assumptions 
of the Founders concerning the treaty process no longer hold true. 
The Founders envisioned direct state representation in the Senate, 
something that "basically evaporated \vith the adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913."302 The Founders also believed 
that the Senate would play a major role in advising the President 
regarding treaties, but its role fairly quickly became one merely of 
consent.303 An even more significant change is that the vast major­
ity of international agreements concluded by the United States to­
day are executive agreements rather than Article II treaties and 
thus do not depend on two-thirds Senate consent at all.304 Never­
theless, these agreements are widely considered to have equal sta­
tus with Article II treaties, at least if they are approved in advance 
or after the fact by a majority of both houses of Congress.30s 
Third, it is arguable that the political process rationale is less 
persuasive in the treaty and executive agreement context than in 
the context of domestic legislation. As a number of commentators 
have pointed out, the treaty and executive agreement process is 
more opaque and less representative than the normal federal legis­
lative process.306 Negotiations are typically conducted by the Exec-
299. See Calabresi, supra note 297, at 794-98. 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11. 
301. Professor John Yoo recently conducted a detailed review of the Founding materials 
with regard to the protection of federalism in general and concluded that the Founders did 
not intend for the political process to be the only protection. See Yoo, supra note 46, at 1357-
91. 
302. Kramer, supra note 46, at 1508. The Constitution originally provided that Senators 
would be "chosen by the Legislature" of each state. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 
(amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment provides that Senators shall be elected "by 
the people" of each state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
303. See liENKm, supra note 4, at 177. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37. 
305. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
306. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 1475-79; John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in 
Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INTL. L. 310, 323-24, 331-32 (1992); 
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 
17 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 681, 683-719 (1996-97). 
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utive, often without much public disclosure. And, as Professor 
Friedman has noted, "[t]here is not much in the political process of 
electing a President that suggests any particular sensitivity to state 
concerns."307 Moreover, the Senate in the case of treaties, and the 
entire Congress in the case of congressional-executive agreements, 
is often confronted with what is essentially an up-or-down vote. 
Unlike much domestic legislation, Congress has essentially no role 
in drafting treaties and it has relatively little ability to modify their 
terms. This has been particularly true in the context of so-called 
"fast-track" legislation.308 Moreover, the costs of a down vote may 
involve not only a failure to commit to the agreement in question, 
but also an inability to participate in the international organization 
associated with the agreement. In these situations, the bargaining 
power of the Senate or Congress is likely to be fairly low, and it 
may feel substantial pressure to approve the commitments already 
made by the President.309 In addition, treaties, especially multilat­
eral treaties, may be more likely than domestic legislation to con­
tain vague and aspirational language, making their effect on state 
prerogatives harder to anticipate during the ratification process.310 
Finally, the construction and implementation of many treaties are 
delegated to international bodies that may lack domestic, let alone 
state, accountability.311 
Notwithstanding these objections to the political process argu­
ment, it must be acknowledged that the Senate often has acted to 
protect states' rights in the treaty context, especially with respect to 
307. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1474. 
308. Fast-track legislation allows the President to conclude trade agreements subject to 
only limited debate and an up-or-down vote in Congress. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, 
The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. lNTL. L. 143 (1992); C. O'Neal 
Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a 
Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INTL. L. & EcoN. 2 (1994). There has been substantial debate in 
Congress recently over whether to renew the President's fast-track authority. See, e.g., 
Sharon Schmickle, Stakes High in Debate on Latin American Trade, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIB., Jan. 3, 1998, at Al. 
309. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 904-05 ("Today's Senate often confronts 
completed agreements that it can reject or revise only on pain of international 
embarrassment."). 
310. See Jackson, supra note 306, at 339. 
311. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1475-79. A good example is the World Trade Organi­
zation. This Organization includes a Dispute Settlement Body that adjudicates trade disputes 
among nations and passes judgment on national laws relating to trade. In two controversial 
decisions, for example, it has declared invalid certain U.S. environmental regulations. See 
Report of the Panel in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, May 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998); Report of the Appellate Body in United States 
- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603 
(1996). 
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human rights treaties.312 Human rights agreements have, to date, 
largely been concluded by means of treaties rather than executive 
agreements. The Senate has been slow to consent to these treaties, 
in part because of federalism concerns. And when it has consented, 
the Senate has sought to protect state interests by declaring the 
treaties to be non-self-executing and by attaching federalism 
clauses.313 As Professor Peter Spiro has noted, there has been "a 
consistent refusal [of the U.S. treaty makers] to displace state law 
with international human rights treaty obligations."314 
Of course, that the Senate has acted in a certain way is no guar­
antee that it will continue to do so as its membership and relation­
ship with the President change.315 Moreover, as discussed above, 
human rights treaties are not the only international agreements that 
raise federalism concerns, and it is far from clear that the Senate's 
practices with regard to human rights treaties will be carried over 
into other contexts. Indeed, if the GAIT and NAFfA agreements 
are any indication, it cannot be assumed that the President will even 
use the Article II treaty process for these other agreements.316 It 
should also be noted that proponents of the nationalist view have 
vigorously challenged the Senate's limitations on human rights trea­
ties, so they may be in no position to rely on these limitations to 
support their political process argument.317 
More importantly, the limitations imposed by the Senate to date 
on human rights treaties do not prevent a majority of Congress 
from relying on the treaties, in conjunction with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, as a source of lawmaking power. Indeed, this is ex-
312. See, e.g., Whitton & Fowler, supra note 158, at 36-38. 
313. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21. 
314. Spiro, supra note 31, at 577. 
315. Professor Spiro has suggested that the Senate's practice might itself now represent a 
constitutional norm, in the spirit of a Bruce Ackerman-style constitutional amendment. See 
id. at 576-78 & nn.32 & 37; cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6-16 (1991) (explaining 
the amendment theory). Although I find this suggestion unpersuasive, I do agree with Pro· 
fessor Spiro that the Senate's practice is relevant to the question of whether to retain Hol­
land. See Spiro, supra note 31, at 578. For powerful critiques of Professor Ackerman's 
amendment theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, ch. 7 (1995), and Michael 
J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's The­
ory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759 (1992). See also Richard A. Posner, 
This Magic Moment, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 32. 
316. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
317. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 14, at 518; Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human 
Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INTI.. L. 341 (1995); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1828 n.24 
(1998). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of 
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 521-22 
(1998) (discussing the limitations imposed by the Senate on human rights treaties and various 
criticisms of them). 
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actly what Congress did in Holland. Thus, as noted . above, a 
number of commentators have suggested recently that Congress 
rely on already-ratified treaties as the basis for overcoming limita­
tions on its domestic lawmaking power.318 This is the process, for 
example, recommended by Professor Neuman for reenactment of 
the RFRA statute.319 In this context, there is no super-majority 
protection in the Senate, so we are left with whatever political pro­
cess checks exist in the majority of Congress - checks viewed by 
the current Supreme Court and many commentators as insufficient 
by themselves to protect the states. 
C. One-Voice Argument 
A third argument against imposing federalism limitations on the 
treaty power is that it would hamper the ability of the United States 
to speak with one voice in international negotiations. According to 
this one-voice argument, if the treaty power were limited by states' 
rights, the Executive's ability to negotiate and conclude vital inter­
national agreements would be severely compromised. As Professor 
Neuman has argued, "[r]equiring the unanimous agreement of . . .  
all the states for ratification of any treaty that includes a provision 
addressing 'local' concerns would greatly hamper American partici­
pation in international treaty regimes."320 
This one-voice argument has strong intuitive appeal. Foreign af­
fairs, after all, concern the entire nation. Moreover, effective inter­
national bargaining may well require that we have a national 
representative with the power to make binding commitments. Con­
sistent with this understanding, the Founders of the Constitution 
envisioned, in the words of James Madison, that "[i]f we are to be 
one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other 
nations."321 In addition, the Supreme Court has emphasized in a 
number of cases the need for exclusive federal control over foreign 
relations. 322 
318. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59, 64-69, 73-95, 99-106. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59. 
320. Neuman, supra note 15, at 48. For a general discussion and partial critique of the 
one-voice argument, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the "One Voice" 
Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in WoRLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND lNrERNATIONAL 
HUMAN Rimrrs 23 {Mark Gibney ed., 1991). 
321. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 42 (James Madison), at 264. 
322. See, e.g., Michelin Trre Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 {1976) ("[T]he Federal 
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign 
governments . . . .  "); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) {describing "foreign affairs 
and international relations" as "matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal 
Government"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all intema-
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It is likely, however, that the one-voice metaphor has never 
been very accurate. At the federal level, it is common for all three 
branches of the government to be involved in foreign affairs mat­
ters, preventing any single federal voice. As Professor Goldsmith 
has observed, "[f]oreign relations law is replete with struggles be­
tween the statute-makers, the treaty-makers, the President, and 
sometimes the courts, for control of the federal foreign relations 
voice."323 In addition, states are involved in a host of regulatory 
activities that sometimes affect foreign affairs, such as criminal 
prosecution of aliens, taxation of multinational corporations, and 
adjudication of cases involving foreign parties or transactions.324 
In any event, the intuitive appeal of the one-voice argument var­
ies dramatically depending on the type of treaty-making involved. 
It is strongest with respect to traditional treaty-making. Most of us 
would agree, for example, that the Executive should not be ham­
pered by federalism concerns when negotiating a peace treaty. But, 
as we have seen, the nature of treaty-making has changed. It now 
purports to regulate many subjects formerly considered domestic in 
nature, especially in the human rights area. With respect to that 
sort of treaty-making, the one-voice argument loses much of its in­
tuitive appeal. It is not at all obvious, for example, that it is neces­
sary or desirable that the country speak through the Executive with 
respect to the regulation of religious freedom. 
Whatever federalism limitations are imposed on the treaty 
power, and I discuss some of the options below, they are likely to 
be relevant almost entirely with respect to the new types of treaty­
making, where the one-voice argument has less appeal. This might 
not always have been the case. When states' rights were viewed 
more expansively, and federal power viewed more narrowly, it is 
possible that federalism limitations, if indiscriminately applied, 
would have interfered with the nation's ability to speak with one 
voice in international relations. Interestingly, during that same pe­
riod of time, there was nevertheless support for limitations on the 
treaty power.325 Today, with federalism at best a weak restraint on 
federal power, any threat to flexibility posed by subjecting the 
treaty power to federalism limitations is substantially lower. 
tional negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines 
disappear."). 
323. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1688. 
324. See id. at 1634-39. 
325. See supra section II.B. 
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Moreover, as a political matter, treaty-making today is already 
subject to federalism limitations on an ad hoc basis. Thus, for ex­
ample, the Senate routinely attaches federalism clauses to human 
rights treaties.326 These clauses have not hampered this country's 
ability to conclude these treaties. Indeed, it may not have been po­
litically possible to conclude these treaties without such clauses.321 
Rejecting the nationalist view would simply give the force of law to 
this practice without substantially interfering with the nation's abil­
ity to conclude treaties. 
The one-voice argument also has less doctrinal support than first 
meets the eye. As noted above, the Court has pulled back from the 
broad reasoning of decisions like Curtiss-Wright.328 Moreover, the 
Court's one-voice statements have always been broader than the 
Court's actual decisions, which have not in fact allowed the federal 
government unfettered power in foreign affairs.329 Perhaps most 
significantly, the Court recently sounded a formal retreat from a 
strong one-voice position. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Board,330 the Court considered a challenge, under the dormant for­
eign commerce clause, to the constitutionality of California's 
"worldwide combined reporting" method for taxing multinational 
corporations. In prior decisions, the Court had held that state tax 
laws would be subject to dormant preemption if they interfered 
with the federal government's ability to " 'speak with one voice 
when regulating commercial relations with foreign govern­
ments.' "331 Relying on that proposition, the petitioners in Barclays 
Bank pointed out that the California law had provoked enormous 
diplomatic controversy with the United States' closest trading part­
ners and had been opposed in numerous executive pronounce­
ments.332 The Court nevertheless rejected their challenge to the 
law, in large part because Congress had shown a willingness to tol­
erate state taxation methods like the one at issue.333 Importantly, 
the Court emphasized that the usual method in our constitutional 
326. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
327. See Stewart, supra note 221, at 1189. 
328. See supra text accompanying notes 279-84. 
329. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic 
Statutory Construction, 43 V AND. L. REv. 1103, 1192-93 (1990) (making this point and citing 
relevant decisions). 
330. 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
331. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (quoting Miche­
lin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). 
332. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324-30. 
333. See 512 U.S. at 324-28. 
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system for overcoming state disuniformity is for Congress to enact a 
statute within the scope of its Article I powers, and the Court indi­
cated that it was unwilling to deviate from that approach just be­
cause foreign affairs were involved.334 As other commentators have 
noted, the Court in Barclays Bank largely repudiated the strong 
"one voice" doctrine suggested in some of its earlier foreign com­
merce clause decisions.335 
· A variation of this one-voice argument would be to claim that 
the scope of the treaty power is a nonjusticiable political question. 
Under the political question doctrine, courts will not review issues 
where there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commit­
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it."336 While there are indeed broad statements by the Supreme 
Court suggesting that foreign affairs is a subject largely outside of 
the scope of judicial review,337 the key problem here, once again, is 
that the Court's statements are premised on the existence of a 
bright line between foreign and domestic affairs. Once this line be­
comes blurred, as it has in the treaty-making area, the justifications 
for judicial abstention diminish. Even if the courts lack competence 
and constitutional authority with respect to truly inter-national rela­
tions, this may not be the case with respect to international agree-
334. See 512 U.S. at 329-31. 
335. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1705 ("As for the one-voice test in dormant foreign 
Co=erce Clause cases: Barclays Bank effectively eliminated it."); Peter J. Spiro, The States 
and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INTL. L. 121, 164 (1994) ("The 
decision was a highly significant retreat in a line of foreign Commerce Clause rulings articu­
lating a 'one voice' approach parallel to other forms of foreign affairs preemption."); Charles 
Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 53 
(1998) ("Ultimately, in the Barclays Bank case, the Supreme Court all but ended the era of 
the Japan Line 'one voice' doctrine."). 
�36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker). 
337. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) ("Matters relating 'to the conduct 
of foreign relations . . .  are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as 
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."' (quoting Harisiades v. Shaugh­
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952))); C. & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
111 (1948) ("Such decisions [concerning foreign policy] are wholly confided by our Constitu­
tion to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative."); Oetjen v. 
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign relations of our 
Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative - 'the polit­
ical' - Departments of the Government . . . .  "). This notion that the political question 
doctrine should be applied broadly to cases involving foreign affairs has been criticized by 
numerous commentators, including proponents of the nationalist view of the treaty power. 
See generally FRANCK, supra note 2; Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 
85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976); Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " 
and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970). 
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ments that regulate the internal relationship between governments 
and their citizens. 
In any event, the Court has made clear that "it is error to sup­
pose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance."338 Rather, the political question 
doctrine shields from judicial review only "those controversies 
which revolve around policy choices and value determinations con­
stitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or 
the confines of the Executive Branch."339 States' rights, according 
to the current Supreme Court, are very much within the scope of 
proper judicial review.340 The Court also has specifically observed 
that the construction of treaties and executive agreements is a 
proper subject for judicial review, even if such construction might 
have consequences for foreign relations.341 While a plurality of the 
Court did conclude in Goldwater v. _Carter342 that a challenge by 
members of Congress to the President's unilateral termination of a 
treaty presented a political question, it did so because the challenge 
involved the respective powers of coordinate federal branches of 
government.343 The scope of the treaty power, by contrast, involves 
the powers of the federal government as a whole vis-a-vis the con­
stituent state governments. As the Court has noted, "it is the rela­
tionship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to 
the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.' "344 
For all of these reasons, neither the one-voice argument nor the 
related political question doctrine justifies giving the treaty power 
immunity from federalism restrictions. This is particularly true with 
respect to the new forms of treaty-making that address issues that 
in the past largely have been regulated by states. As for those trea­
ties, the one-voice argument simply begs the question: the argu-
338. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
339. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Socy., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
340. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52. 
341. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 212; see also Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 ("As Baker 
plainly held . . .  the courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, 
and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and ac­
cepted task for the federal courts."). 
342. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
343. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002. For an argument that judicial review is proper even 
under these circumstances, see FRANCK, supra note 2, at 36-38. 
344. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. It is also worth noting that the First Judiciary Act included a 
provision specifically allowing challenges to the validity of treaties, suggesting that this issue 
was not originally viewed as nonjusticiable. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 
85-87 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)) (conferring federal court jurisdiction over 
suits "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty"). 
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ment is premised on the need to protect federal prerogatives in 
foreign affairs, yet whether the new forms of treaty-making are in 
fact federal prerogatives is exactly what is at issue. 
V. PROTECTING AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
As discussed above, the nationalist view of the treaty power is 
unsupported by history, and its principal legal and policy justifica­
tions are questionable. Consequently, to the extent that American 
federalism continues to be worth protecting, there does not appear 
to be any good justification for exempting the treaty power from 
this protection. Indeed, at least some of the reasons for protecting 
federalism, such as the desirability of having a check against the 
centralization of power, would seem to be especially relevant to the 
treaty power, which entails the centralization of power even further 
away from the average U.S. citizen than does domestic 
legislation.345 
The question remains, however, how federalism should be pro­
tected. As we have seen, the political process does not appear by 
itself to offer sufficient protection. Because there are two compo­
nents of the nationalist view of the treaty power, there are, at least 
in theory, two additional avenues for protecting federalism. The 
treaty power could be subjected to some sort of a subject matter 
test, or it could be subjected to structural federalism limitations. In 
this Part, I consider both possibilities. 
As I explain, the answer to this question may be different today 
than it would have been in the past. Historically, it often was 
assumed that the treaty power was appropriate only for certain 
externally oriented subjects. As the distinction between foreign 
and domestic affairs wanes, however, it becomes increasingly diffi­
cult to maintain any meaningful subject matter limitation. As a re­
sult, I argue that it makes more sense today to focus on structural 
federalism limitations on the treaty power, and, for a variety of rea­
sons, I argue that the treaty power should be subject to the same 
federalism limitations that apply to Congress's legislative powers. 
In other words, my argument is that the federal government should 
not be able to use the treaty power (or executive agreement power) 
to create domestic law that could not be created by Congress. To 
the extent that this conclusion would require overruling Holland, I 
345. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1477-81; Detlev Vagts, International Agreements, the 
Senate and the Constitution, 36 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 143, 154 (1997). 
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argue that the justifications for stare decisis are weak in this 
context. 
A. Reviving a Subject Matter Limitation 
One option for protecting federalism in this context would be to 
revive a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. After all, 
such a limitation has substantial historical support and was rejected 
by commentators only recently. Moreover, this limitation has never 
been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court and thus presumably 
could be revived without revisiting settled Supreme Court prece­
dent. Indeed, Holland itself arguably assumed that there was such 
a limitation on the treaty power.346 
There are two possibilities here. The first would be to limit the 
treaty power to matters usually the subject of treaties at the time 
the Constitution was adopted. This was one of the limitations sug­
gested by Jefferson.347 This suggested limitation has never received 
much acceptance, however.348 Moreover, as a policy matter, this 
limitation would seem to be highly undesirable. Not only would it 
exclude U.S. participation in human rights treaties, it also would 
presumably exclude U.S. participation in treaties relating to the en­
vironment, terrorism, and private international law, to name a few 
subjects. Moreover, it is doubtful that this limitation could be justi­
fied even under a strict originalist interpretation of the Constitu­
tion. There is no evidence that the Founders intended the treaty 
power to be frozen to 1780s issues, and the inflexibility such a limi­
tation would impose on the national government makes it highly 
unlikely that the Founders would have had such an intent. And, of 
course, other constitutional powers - such as the commerce power 
- have not been limited in this fashion.349 
The other possibility would be to limit the treaty power to mat­
ters that are truly "international" in nature. This is the approach 
suggested, for example, by Charles Evans Hughes and the Restate­
ment (Second).350 Although this approach may deserve further ex­
ploration, it suffers from a substantial problem: Today, almost any 
346. See supra text accompanying note 190-194. 
347. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48. 
348. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
349. Cf. Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 
U. PA. L. REv. 1012, 1021 (1968) ("[S]uch a limitation cannot be taken seriously . . . .  There is 
as little, or less, reason for limiting the treaty power to those matters about which nations 
negotiated in the eighteenth century as there is for limiting the commerce power or the war 
powers to the needs of that era."). 
350. See supra text accompanying notes 227-30, 242-45. 
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issue can plausibly be labeled "international." Given the globaliza­
tion of trade, technology, and travel, among other things, nations 
are indisputably connected to each other in a variety of ways. As a 
result, "domestic" actions by nations are often matters of concern 
to the international community. As Professor Tribe has observed, 
"[w]ith global interdependence reaching across an ever broadening 
spectrum of issues," any requirement that the treaty power be re­
stricted to matters of international concern "seems unlikely to 
prove a serious limitation."351 
This may be true even in the area of human rights. Human 
rights is, of course, a matter today of international negotiation and 
agreement. Unlike some proponents of the nationalist view,352 I do 
not find that fact alone dispositive of the question whether this sub­
ject falls within the scope of the federal government's treaty power. 
If it were dispositive, it would mean that the federal government's 
power in this regard would be determined entirely by the interna­
tional community rather than by domestic-law standards, something 
at odds with this country's "dualist" approach to international 
law.353 Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute that, in this day and 
age, how one nation treats its citizens has international effects.354 
These effects may be direct and physical - for example, an influx 
of refugees, or instability in the region. Or they may be more ab­
stract and emotional - for example, a sense of moral outrage, or 
an empathetic loss. Anyone who has observed recent events in 
Tiananmen Square, Somalia, or Rwanda will find it difficult to deny 
the existence of such effects. 
351. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 228; see also, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 1442 ("As the 
world gets smaller, it will become more difficult to separate the domestic and foreign 
spheres."); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1669-80 (discussing the waning of the distinction be­
tween domestic and foreign affairs). 
352. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 15, at 46. 
353. Under the dualist approach, international and domestic law are treated as distinct, 
the individual nation determines for itself when and to what extent international law is incor­
porated into its legal system, and the status of international law in the domestic system is 
determined by domestic law. See Loms HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW! CASES AND 
MATERIALS 153-54 (3d ed. 1993). For a recent confirmation by the Supreme Court of this 
country's dualist approach, see Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998), where the Court 
made clear that the incorporation and enforcement of international law is subject to domestic 
law standards, such as habeas corpus limitations, the last-in-time rule concerning conflicts 
between treaties and federal statutes, and the Eleventh Amendment. See generally Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Breard Case, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 
STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999). 
354. For a strong argument that human rights treaties involve matters of "international 
concern," see Henkin, supra note 349; see also Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C.K. 
Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Ra· 
tional Action, 59 YALE LJ. 60 (1949) (arguing that human rights is a proper subject for 
international regulation). 
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But perhaps a focus on effects is not the right test. Another test 
would be a focus on need. The question here might be whether the 
issue requires international cooperation in order to be addressed. 
This is, after all, how the Court described the migratory bird treaty 
at issue in Holland. Under this test, human rights treaties might be 
suspect, since their implementation involves action by individual 
governments within their territories rather than cooperative ac­
tion.355 But this line is fuzzy at best. It is arguable that there is in 
fact a demonstrable need for cooperative international action to ad­
dress even "domestic" issues such as human rights. Without recip­
rocal agreements, along with international monitoring and other 
enforcement mechanisms, many nations might well continue to en­
gage in human rights abuses. Perhaps treaties are required to ob­
tain results even here. To be sure, the proliferation of human rights 
treaties has not eliminated human rights abuses in the countries 
that have ratified them, but it is certainly possible that it has helped 
improve conditions. 
In any event, even if there were a workable distinction in theory 
between international and domestic matters, it seems unlikely that 
U.S. courts would feel competent to contradict the political 
branches on this issue. It is far from clear, for example, what stan­
dard the courts could use to draw such a line. Unlike some grants 
of federal power, the wording of the treaty power does not itself 
suggest any particular subject restriction. In construing the scope of 
the Commerce Clause, for example, one might look to the move­
ment of goods or the exchange of money.356 But other than the 
form of the agreement itself, what is an attribute of a permissible 
treaty? International law does not appear to offer any help. A 
treaty is defined in international law simply as an agreement con­
cluded between nation-states.357 The only subject matter limitation 
under international law is that treaties cannot violate certain funda­
mental jus co gens norms, none of which is likely to have much rele-
355. Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States 
Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2o 355, 359 (1998) ("If two nations are not inclined for 
purely domestic reasons to provide a certain level of individual rights protection to their 
citizens, they gain nothing from a mutual promise to provide greater protection to their 
citizens."). 
356. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("The possession of a gun 
in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition 
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."). 
357. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1), S. TREATY 
Doc. No. 92-1 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
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vance to U.S. treaties:358 Moreover, at least since the New Deal, 
the Supreme Court has imposed few subject matter restraints even 
on the federal powers that seem amenable to such a limitation.359 
The difficulty of judicial line-drawing here is compounded by 
the changing nature of the subject. What is considered "interna­
tional" will undoubtedly vary over time, as world conditions and 
relationships between nations change. As Professor Henkin has ex­
plained: "What is of international concern, what affects American 
foreign relations and is relevant to American foreign policy, what 
matters the United States wishes to negotiate about, differ from 
generation to generation, perhaps from year to year, with the ever­
changing character of relations between nations."360 In other areas 
of foreign affairs law, it is evident that the courts tend to defer to 
the political branches and, indeed, attempt to shift decisionmaking 
on such issues to those branches.361 They are particularly likely to 
do so with respect to the scope of this country's international 
relations. 
A recent decision that illustrates this point is the Second Cir­
cuit's decision in United States v. Lue. 362 The defendant in that 
case, a foreign national, was convicted under the Hostage Taking 
Act, a statute enacted as part of this country's implementation of 
358. Jus cogens norms, also called "peremptory" norms, are rules of customary interna· 
tional law "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention, supra 
note 357, art. 53; see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715-17 
{9th Cir. 1992) (discussing attributes of peremptory norms); Committee of United States Citi· 
zens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 {D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 13, § 102 cmt. k, reporters' note 6 (same). As these materials explain, 
jus cogens norms concern only a few egregious international law violations, such as genocide, 
war crimes, and torture. 
359. See Kramer, supra note 46, at 1488. 
360. Henkin, supra note 349, at 1025. 
361. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) (refusing 
to preempt state tax on multinational corporations, despite protests from foreign govern· 
ments, because "we leave it to Congress - whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's - to 
evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy"); 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 {1992) (refusing to invalidate abduction 
of foreign suspect from Mexico at behest of United States officials, noting that "the decision 
of whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the [extradition] 
Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch"); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
259 {1991) (refusing to apply Title VII extraterritorially and noting that "Congress, should it 
wish to do so, may similarly amend Title VII and in doing so will be able to calibrate its 
provisions in a way that we cannot"); see also Bradley, supra note 317, at 525-29 (making this 
point in connection with the canon of construction that federal statutes are to be construed 
not to violate international law); Bradley, supra note 92, at 550-61 (making this point in 
connection with courts' use of the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
362. 134 F.3d 79 {2d Cir. 1998). 
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the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.363 
The basis for the conviction was the defendant's attempted abduc­
tion of a person in New York for the purpose of compelling the 
victim's relatives to pay ransom. Consistent with the terms of the 
Convention, the Hostage Taking Act applies even to domestic 
kidnappings if done "in order to compel a third person or a govern­
mental organization to do or abstain from doing any act," except 
that the Act does not apply where "each alleged offender and each 
person seized or detained are nationals of the United States, and 
each alleged offender is found in the United States, unless the gov­
ernmental organization sought to be compelled is the Government 
of the United States."364 Since the defendant in this case was a for­
eign national, this exception did not apply. 
In response to the defendant's argument that the Act's regula­
tion of domestic crimes was beyond the scope of the treaty power, 
the court stated that "[t]he defendant relies far too heavily on a 
dichotomy between matters of purely domestic concern and those 
of international concern, a dichotomy appropriately criticized by 
commentators in the field. "365 While acknowledging that there 
"must be certain outer limits" to the scope of the treaty power, the 
court explained that the Act's regulation of hostage taking could 
easily be classified as a matter of international concern: 
Whatever the potential outer limit on the treaty power of the Execu­
tive, the Hostage Taking Convention does not transgress it. At the 
most general level, the Convention addresses - at least in part - the 
treatment of foreign nationals while they are on local soil, a matter of 
central concern among nations. More specifically, the Convention ad­
dresses a matter of grave concern to the international community: 
hostage taking as a vehicle for terrorism.366 
Given that the subject matter could plausibly be characterized as 
one of international concern, the court believed that it was inappro­
priate for the judiciary to second-guess the treaty-makers and 
thereby "impinge upon the Executive's prerogative in matters per­
taining to foreign affairs. "367 
As this decision illustrates, the line between what is domestic 
and what is international is difficult to define, the scope of what can 
plausibly be labeled international has grown substantially in recent 
363. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,081. 
364. 18 u.s.c. § 1203 (1994). 
365. Lue, 134 F.3d at 83 (citing the Restatement (Third), supra note 13). 
366. Lue, 134 F.3d at 83. 
367. Lue, 134 F.3d at 83. 
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years, and courts as a result are unlikely to restrict the treaty power 
much, if at all, based on this distinction. If federalism is to be pro­
tected in the treaty context, another approach must be found. 
B. Parity with Federal Legislation 
Another option for protecting federalism, and the option I 
favor, would be to subject the treaty power to the same federalism 
restrictions that apply to Congress's legislative powers. Under this 
approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional regula­
tory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the 
United States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it 
could not be used to resurrect legislation determined by the 
Supreme Court to be beyond Congress's legislative powers, such as 
the legislation at issue in the recent New York, Lopez, Boerne, and 
Printz decisions.368 
As mentioned above, this approach was endorsed by George 
Nicholas during the Virginia Ratifying Convention,369 Thomas Jef­
ferson in his Manual on Parliamentary Practice,370 and the Supreme 
Court in its 1836 decision, New Orleans v. United States.371 It also is 
essentially the law in Canada, where the treaty power has been con­
strued not to give the national government legislative power over 
matters reserved to the provinces.372 
In addition to this historical and comparative-law support, there 
are several conceptual and doctrinal reasons why it may make sense 
today to subject treaties to the same federalism limitations as fed­
eral statutes. First, unlike traditional treaties that were generally 
bilateral and addressed the relations between nations, both the 
form and substance of modern treaty law resembles domestic legis­
lation. As discussed above, treaty law today regulates the relations 
between nations and their citizens, it covers many of the same sub­
jects as domestic law, and it is even made in a kind of legislative 
way, through mechanisms such as multilateral drafting 
conferences. 373 
368. See supra notes 47-59. 
369. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
370. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. 
372. See Canada v. Ontario, 1937 App. Cas. 326, 354 (P.C. 1937) (appeal taken from 
Can.); Friesen, supra note 188, at 1416. For a discussion of the scope of the treaty power in a 
variety of federal systems, see Iv AN BERNIER, lNrERNATIONAL LEGAL AsPEcrs OF FEDER· 
ALISM 152-71 (1973). 
373. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 13, § 102 cmt. f ("Multilateral agreements open to all states . . .  are increasingly used for 
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Second, as the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 
recognized,374 the immunity of the treaty power from states' -rights 
limitations is premised on the existence of a meaningful distinction 
between the foreign and the domestic. Yet proponents of the na­
tionalist view themselves, probably correctly, deny that we can con­
tinue to make this distinction. Once that is denied, however, there 
is a much stronger case, based upon the limited and enumerated 
powers doctrine, for subjecting the treaty power to the same limita­
tions that apply to other federal law. 
Third, there is strong doctrinal support for the equal treatment 
of federal statutes and treaties. Since at least the late 1800s, the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that treaties and federal stat­
utes have an equal status in the U.S. system, such that, in the case of 
a conflict, the last in time is the controlling domestic law.375 This 
well-settled equality of treaties and federal statutes supports treat­
ing them as equal as well for federalism purposes.376 As the 
Supreme Court has observed, its decisions "generally have re­
garded treaties as on much the same plane as acts of Congress, and 
as usually subject to the general limitations in the Constitution."377 
Indeed, not treating them the same with respect to federalism limi­
tations presents a doctrinal puzzle: If treaties can be made that go 
beyond what Congress could do pursuant to its legislative powers, 
then what happens to Congress's ability to supersede the treaty 
with subsequent legislation? As William Mikell explained many 
years ago: 
If, however, a treaty were made which affected the reserved rights of 
the states, it is, to say the least, doubtful if such a treaty could be 
abrogated at all without the consent of the President, for Congress 
having no power to pass a law, affecting the reserved rights of the 
states, could enact no law either in affirmance or derogation of the 
treaty.378 
general legislation . . . .  "); John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multi­
lateral Solutions is Changing the Character of "International" Law, 42 KAN. L. REv. 605, 606 
{1994) (describing the "proliferation of multilateral sets of rules"); Van Alstine, supra note 
83, at 700 ("From a substantial perspective . . .  the [private law] conventions have the look 
and feel of standard federal statutes."). 
374. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
375. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600-02 (1889); Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 {1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); see gener­
ally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987). 
376. For an early argument to this effect, see James Harrington Boyd, The Treaty-Making 
Power of the United States and Alien Land Laws in States, 6 CAL. L. REv. 279 {1918). See 
also 5 MOORE, supra note 177, at 166. 
377. United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 208 (1926). 
378. Mikell, supra note 157, at 536-37. 
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Further doctrinal support for imposing on the treaty power the 
same federalism limitations as those imposed on Congress's Article 
I powers can be found in cases involving the Eleventh Amendment. 
This Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi­
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State."379 This language refers only to suits by citizens and subjects, 
but it has been held to apply to suits by foreign nations themselves 
against U.S. states.380 Moreover, although the language refers to 
jurisdiction, the Amendment has been read as embodying more 
general principles of state sovereignty. 381 Importantly, the 
Supreme Court has held that the federal government cannot over­
come the Eleventh Amendment (as so defined) by means of Con­
gress's commerce power.382 The question remains, however, 
whether the federal government can overcome Eleventh Amend­
ment imm�nity by means of its treaty power. The distinction made 
in Holland and Reid between federalism limitations on Article I 
powers and those on the treaty power at least raises the possibility 
that the treaty power should be treated differently from the com­
merce power with respect to the Eleventh Amendment.383 Re­
cently, however, the Supreme Court made clear that treaty claims, 
even when brought by foreign governments, are indeed subject to 
the Eleventh Amendment.384 
Notwithstanding this doctrinal support, a principal disadvantage 
of this proposal is that it might require overruling at least some 
portion of the Holland decision. The Court in Holland was unclear 
about many things, but one thing it did make clear is that the treaty 
379. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. 
380. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934); see also Blatch­
ford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 780-82 (1991) (relying on Monaco to support the exist­
ence of Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against states by Indian tribes). 
381. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). 
382. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. 
383. For commentators making this argument, see, for example, Lori Fisler Damrosch, 
The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, 92 AM. J. INTL. L. 697 (1998); and 
Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J. 
lNrr.. L. 691 (1998). 
384. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998). Before this decision, a number 
of lower courts had reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998); United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 
1997). The Restatement (Third) similarly expresses the view that the treaty power is subject 
to the Eleventh Amendment. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 reporters' 
note 3. 
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power is not subject to the same federalism restrictions as Con­
gress's lawmaking powers.385 My proposal's deviation from Hol­
land, however, is not as great as it first might appear. The specific 
holding of the Holland decision - that the migratory bird treaty 
was a proper exercise of the treaty power - presumably would be 
preserved, given the much narrower scope of the Tenth Amend­
ment today. Moreover, as discussed above, although Holland has 
been construed as giving the treaty power complete immunity from 
federalism limitations, the decision itself can be read much more 
narrowly.386 Recent confirmation of this can be found in the brief 
filed by the Clinton administration in the recent Breard case stating 
that there are in fact federalism limits on the national government's 
power to enforce treaties.387 
In any event, the Supreme Court has said that stare decisis car­
ries less weight with respect to constitutional decisions, since Con­
gress cannot overturn them.388 This is especially so when 
fundamental assumptions in the first decision no longer hold 
true.389 That is exactly the case with respect to Holland. 
The world in which Holland was decided looks very different 
from our own. The Court in Holland assumed that the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce was relatively narrow. 
As a result, the Court thought it necessary that the treaty power be 
more expansive than the commerce power, in order to address 
"matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an 
act of Congress could not deal with."39° Today, of course, Con­
gress's commerce power is extremely broad, and it is likely to re­
main so notwithstanding the Supreme Court's renewed 
commitment to federalism. 
Holland also was decided at a time when customary interna­
tional law, rather than treaties, was the dominant form of interna­
tional law.391 Since then, however, there has been a proliferation of 
385. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
386. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07. Another area of doctrinal support is in 
the area of separation of powers. As discussed above, it is generally accepted that the treaty 
power is subject to the same separation of powers limitations as Congress's legislative pow­
ers. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86. 
387. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
388. For a recent statement by the Court to this effect, see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 
1997, 2016 (1997). 
389. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997) (emphasizing, in overturn­
ing a prior antitrust decision, the need for "recognizing and adapting to changed circum­
stances and the lessons of accumulated experience"). 
390. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
391. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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treaties, as well as the rise of numerous multilateral treaty regimes, 
such that treaties "have become the principal vehicle for making 
law for the international system."392 This shift from custom to code 
has meant that international law is now more specific and regulates 
a substantially wider range of subjects. As Professor Mark Janis has 
observed, today "[v]irtually every human activity is to some degree 
the object of some treaty."393 These changes have thus substan­
tially heightened the significance of the treaty power in this 
country. 
The Court in Holland also appeared to assume that treaties 
would deal only with matters concerning truly inter-national rela­
tions. Thus, the Court emphasized that the treaty there concerned 
a problem that "can be protected only by national action in concert 
with that of another power."394 Since then, however, we have seen 
the rise of international human rights law, which regulates the rela­
tions between nations and their citizens. Among other things, this 
means that there is today a significantly greater overlap and poten­
tial for conflict between treaty law and U.S. domestic law. 
Finally, the Court in Holland placed great emphasis on the dele­
gation language of Article II,395 something problematic on its own 
terms but especially so given that most international agreements 
concluded by the President today take the form of executive agree­
ments rather than Article II treaties. Even if it were true that the 
treaty clause in Article II was intended to delegate unlimited law­
making power to the federal government, subject only to certain 
process protections, this clause has become much less relevant to 
American treaty-making. 
In sum, there is a strong case - based on history, doctrine, and 
policy - for subjecting the treaty power to the same federalism 
limitations that apply to Congress's legislative powers. This ap­
proach would involve overruling some of the reasoning in Holland, 
but that reasoning has become questionable in light of changes in 
both the nature of treaty-making and the scope of federal legislative 
power. It is particularly questionable if, contrary to the Court's ap­
parent assumption in Holland, there is no subject matter limitation 
on the treaty power. Importantly, this proposal would not interfere 
substantially with the treaty power. It might preclude some of the 
broadest intrusions on state power, such as Professor Neuman's re-
392. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. I, introductory note, at 18. 
393. MARK W. JANis, AN lNTRooucnoN TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2d ed. 1993). 
394. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
395. 252 U.S. at 432. 
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cent proposal concerning RFRA, but it would leave the political 
branches with substantial flexibility to conclude and implement in­
ternational agreements in the national interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The treaty power in this country is a power to malrn supreme 
federal law. For much of our history, courts, commentators, and 
government officials have assumed that this power is limited by 
subject matter, states' rights, or both. In recent years, however, 
conventional wisdom has denied any such limitations. The result of 
this view is that the treaty makers have essentihlly unlimited power 
vis-a-vis the states. Such unlimited power, however, is inconsistent 
with a central principle of American federalism - that the national 
government's powers are limited and enumerated. This inconsis­
tency is particularly significant today, in light of the rapidly ex­
panding nature of this country's treaty commitments. 
Faced with this conflict between foreign affairs orthodoxy and 
federalism, we could, of course, abandon our commitment to pro­
tecting federalism. Perhaps the increased globalization and interde­
pendence of nations renders federalism obsolete. On the other 
hand, these forces might actually increase the desire for local de­
mocracy and experimentation and thus make federalism even more 
attractive.396 In any event, we must make a choice. As we continue 
with what is in essence an "international New Deal," we must de­
cide whether federalism is worth preserving. If it is, the nationalist 
view of the treaty power should be reconsidered. 
This is not the only foreign affairs issue that may require recon­
sideration. As I have explained, the nationalist view of the treaty 
power is but one example of an approach that could be called "for­
eign affairs exceptionalism." This approach, which is largely a 
product of academic and judicial thinking during the 1920s through 
the 1940s, distinguishes sharply between domestic and foreign af­
fairs. As we enter the next century, that distinction, and the foreign 
affairs exceptionalism that it justifies, will become increasingly diffi­
cult to maintain. 
396. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1443 ("As we become subject to regulation that de­
velops farther and farther from our grasp, there will be a strong incentive to reinvigorate 
local and state government, in order to return control over other aspects of our lives to 
governments quite close to home."). 
